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GETTING BEYOND INTUITION IN THE PROBABLE CAUSE
INQUIRY
by
Erica Goldberg
Courts are proudly resigned to the fact that the probable cause inquiry is
“nontechnical.” In order to conduct a search or make an arrest, police
need to satisfy the probable cause standard, which the Supreme Court has
deemed “incapable of precise definition or quantification into
percentages.” The flexibility of this elusive standard enables courts to
defer to police officers’ reasonable judgments and expert intuitions in
unique situations. However, police officers are increasingly using
investigative techniques that replace their own observational skills with
test results from some other source, such as drug sniffing dogs, facial
recognition technology, and DNA matching. The reliability of such
practices can and should be quantified, but the vagueness of the probable
cause standard renders it impossible for judges to determine which error
rates are inconsistent with probable cause.
This Article confronts the intersection between quantifiable evidence and
the relentlessly fuzzy probable cause standard. It proposes that the
probable cause standard be assigned a numerical value as a minimum
threshold, especially in cases where probable cause is based on
mechanistic techniques that essentially replace a police officer’s own
judgment. The Article begins by exploring how the police and courts
currently apply the probable cause standard, including courts’
confrontations with probabilities. It then explains why certain evidence
should require quantified error rates to establish probable cause and how
to properly calculate these error rates. In the final section, the Article
argues that assigning a minimum percentage to probable cause would
add much-needed clarity to the law and protect against systemic abuses.
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I. Introduction

Courts are proudly resigned to the fact that the probable cause
1
inquiry is “nontechnical.” To conduct a search or make an arrest, a
police officer must establish probable cause based on the totality of the
circumstances. This approach allows for great flexibility in the
application of facts to the standard. Adding uncertainty to this flexibility,
the actual legal standard of probable cause remains undefined. The
Supreme Court has deemed probable cause “incapable of precise
2
definition or quantification into percentages” and, just this year,
overturned the Florida Supreme Court’s efforts to add a more rigorous
3
framework to the inquiry. Judges, prosecutors, and scholars display
varying understandings as to the degree of suspicion that probable cause
4
requires. The deferential standard that reviewing courts apply to
probable cause determinations further exacerbates the confusion.
The murkiness of the probable cause standard has many virtues,
primarily in situations requiring the appraisal of many different facts,
some tending towards suspicion and some undermining it. A flexible
standard allows police to rely on their expertise, intuition, and
1

Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 370 (2003) (quoting Illinois v. Gates,
462 U.S. 213, 231 (1983)).
2
Id. at 371.
3
Florida v. Harris, 133 S. Ct. 1050, 1053 (2013).
4
See infra Part II.C.
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observational skills to decide whether suspicious behavior warrants
further action, without the constraints of a rigid test. In complex cases,
quantification of the standard by assigning it a numerical percentage
would obscure the true, qualitative nature of the inquiry and create a
5
false sense of precision. Plus, judges, concerned about institutional
6
incompetence, may simply be “afraid of math.”
There is a subset of cases, however, where the virtues of the
imprecise definition of probable cause all but disappear. Consider a real
case where Moose the drug detection dog, undergoing a training
exercise at a storage facility, alerted to the presence of drugs in one of
7
the storage bins where the police had not planted drugs. The police
sought to obtain a warrant to search the locker based solely on Moose’s
alert and the fact that that the lessee of the storage bin, whose name was
given to police after Moose’s alert, had a prior record of drug
8
convictions. Whether or not probable cause exists to issue the warrant
depends largely on Moose’s reliability, which can be quantified based on
Moose’s error rate in detecting drugs.
There are an increasing number of situations, like the one involving
Moose, where the police rely on machines or tools (such as a dog) to
9
create their suspicion. As a result, the likelihood of criminal activity can
be quantified. In such situations, the virtues of having an undefined
probable cause standard are outweighed by its vices, including the lack of
uniformity in application and susceptibility to abuse. In cases where the
critical evidence at issue is produced through a mechanistic process,
where police essentially outsource their intuition, this Article argues that
reasonable officers cannot differ greatly on the strength of the evidence,
and the arguments opposing quantifying the probable cause standard are
not compelling. Further, even in cases where the evidence demonstrating
probable cause cannot be quantified, having a well-defined legal
standard does not detract from the discretion and flexibility the police
would have in assessing the totality of the circumstances of the facts of a
case.
5
Orin Kerr, Why Courts Should Not Quantify Probable Cause, in The Political
Heart of Criminal Procedure: Essays on Themes of William J. Stuntz 131, 131–
32 (Michael Klarman et al. eds., 2012) (discussing how quantifying probable cause
would lead to less accurate probable cause determinations by undermining a judge’s
logical intuition).
6
Id. at 132 (joking that this is one reason for the refusal to quantify the
probable cause standard). If judges are afraid of math, this is perhaps rightfully so.
See infra Part III for a discussion of the difficulties involved in incorporating statistical
evidence into the probable cause inquiry.
7
United States v. Cook, 904 F.2d 37, *1–2 (6th Cir. 1990) (No. 89-5947)
(unpublished disposition).
8
Id.
9
Dogs are considered tools like other machines used by the police or
forensic scientists. See Colin Miller, Hear Spot Bark: Washington Court of Appeals Rejects
Argument that Dog Barking Constitutes Hearsay, EvidenceProf Blog (Nov. 15, 2007),
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/evidenceprof/2007/11/hear-spot-bark-.html.
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Currently, the probable cause inquiry provides room for reasonable
officers to differ on the strength of their suspicion. Courts making
probable cause assessments consider whether the facts and circumstances
warrant a person of “‘reasonable caution in the belief that’ an offense has
10
been or is being committed.” When a magistrate judge undertakes the
probable cause inquiry to determine whether a warrant should issue, she
must decide only if there is a “fair probability that contraband or
11
evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” Later, if
contraband or evidence of a crime is found, the reviewing court at the
criminal trial need only “ensure that the magistrate had a ‘substantial
12
basis for . . . conclud[ing]’ that probable cause existed.”
At these increasingly deferential levels of inquiry, it is unclear what
degree of suspicion is required before a magistrate can ratify an officer’s
13
judgment of probable cause. Does a reasonable police officer have to
“believe” by greater than 50% that a crime is being committed? And, do
we look at whether any reasonable officer could believe by greater than
50% in the existence of criminal activity? Then, in defining a “fair
probability,” should magistrate judges allow some band of error around
their own determination of 50% likelihood to provide room for
reasonable police officers to differ? If a magistrate judge himself deems
that there is an approximately 35% chance that evidence could be found
in a home, but appreciates that reasonable officers could believe the
chance to be 60%, should the warrant issue? Further, does the substantial
basis review of a magistrate’s decision place an even broader band
around a police officer’s greater than 50% belief that a crime is
occurring so as to allow for reasonable magistrate judges to differ?
Courts have not confronted these questions. Yet, as technology
progresses, more tools are available that replace a police officer’s
intuition and judgment with mechanistic findings, where the degree of
14
suspicion can and should be quantified. Courts have determined, for
example, that both positive alerts from drug sniffing dogs and fingerprint
matches are sufficient on their own, without any other evidence, to satisfy
15
probable cause. To establish that a police officer reasonably relied on
10

Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175–76 (1949) (quoting Carroll
v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925)).
11
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983).
12
Id. at 238–39 (quoting Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 271 (1960)).
Not all courts fashion these standards the same way. See Cook, 904 F.2d 37, *2; infra
Part II.C.
13
See infra Part II.C.
14
According to one scholar, “just on the horizon” are “handheld gun
detectors, software protocols that sift through e-mails searching for illegal material, or
facial recognition technology.” Ric Simmons, The Two Unanswered Questions of Illinois v.
Caballes: How To Make the World Safe for Binary Searches, 80 Tul. L. Rev. 411, 413 (2005).
15
See, e.g., Florida v. Harris, 133 S. Ct. 1050, 1057 (2013) (“If a bona fide
organization has certified a dog after testing his reliability in a controlled setting, a
court can presume (subject to any conflicting evidence offered) that the dog’s alert
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these types of techniques, quantifiable error rates are often incorporated
into the probable cause inquiry. Some courts have even held that certain
16
investigative techniques must be assessed using quantified error rates.
Once the reliability of practices like the use of drug sniffing dogs,
17
fingerprint analysis, partial DNA matching, or facial recognition
technology is quantified, however, the vagueness of the probable cause
standard renders it impossible to determine which, if any, error rates are
inconsistent with probable cause. Police cannot predict whether a
particular investigative technique is reliable enough on its own to satisfy
the probable cause inquiry. Judges do not know if probable cause
requires a 40%, 50%, or 51% likelihood that a suspect has committed or
18
will commit a particular crime. Our privacy rights vary not only because
judges and police officers assess facts differently, an unavoidable and
often beneficial consequence of a system administered by human beings,
but also because they are using different legal standards. This creates a
system prone to inconsistency and vulnerable to abuse.
provides probable cause to search.”); United States v. Scarborough, 128 F.3d 1373,
1378 (10th Cir. 1997) (“It is undisputed that a drug sniffing dog’s detection of
contraband in itself establishes probable cause for a search warrant.”); United States
v. Waltzer, 682 F.2d 370, 372 (2d Cir. 1982) (holding that a drug sniffing dog’s
positive alert to the smell of contraband in luggage “itself establish[es] probable
cause, enough for the arrest, more than enough for the stop”); People v. Moon,
No. 1-09-3106, 2011 Ill. App. Unpub. LEXIS 745, at *7 (Ill. App. Ct. Apr. 26, 2011)
(“The evidence at trial established that the police had probable cause to arrest
defendant when they determined that the kitchen window was the point of entry,
gathered finger and palm prints from the outside of the kitchen window that was
behind a storm window, determined that the prints belonged to defendant and
ascertained from Turner that she did not know defendant or give him permission to
enter her residence.”).
16
Recently, the Florida Supreme Court held that a positive alert by a
certified drug sniffing dog does not presumptively establish probable cause to
conduct a search, and accuracy rates are needed to assess a dog’s reliability. Harris v.
State, 71 So. 3d 756, 758–59 (Fla. 2011). This decision was reversed by the Supreme
Court in an opinion reaffirming the flexible, “totality of the circumstances” test
applied to all probable cause determinations. See Harris, 133 S. Ct. at 1055. The
Court’s unanimous opinion, which presumes that sufficient training and certification
render a dog sniff reliable enough to establish probable cause, id. at 1056–59,
fundamentally misunderstands the problems inherent in relying on false positive
rates and recognizing alerts of “residual odors” as correct alerts. See infra Part III.C.
Cf. State v. Anez, 738 N.E.2d 491, 497 (Ohio Com. Pl. 2000) (excluding evidence of a
field breath sobriety test because “the results of a scientific test may not be introduced
unless there is foundational testimony that the device used was operating with a
sufficient degree of accuracy”).
17
DNA matching is most relevant to the probable cause inquiry in the
context of partial matching of DNA found at a crime scene to DNA in a databank,
thus implicating possible family members of the person whose DNA has been stored
in the databank. See infra Part III.B; see generally Erin Murphy, Relative Doubt: Familial
Searches of DNA Databases, 109 Mich. L. Rev. 291 (2010).
18
Some judges have held that probable cause is satisfied even when error
rates were between 40% and 50%. United States v. Donnelly, 475 F.3d 946, 955 (8th
Cir. 2007) (probable cause established despite dog’s error rate close to 50%).
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This Article argues that when quantifiable evidence is the primary
basis for an officer’s suspicion, that evidence should be held to a
minimum threshold of required certainty. Although scholars have
touched upon whether fallible tools like drug sniffing dogs and facial
recognition technology can yield evidence that satisfies the probable
19
cause standard and have debated the appropriate level of flexibility with
20
which probable cause should be defined, this Article confronts the
intersection of probabilistic evidence and the probable cause standard
and proposes assigning a numerical value to the probable cause standard
in cases where error rates are largely dispositive of the probable cause
inquiry.
Part II of the Article details how the police and courts currently
apply the concept of probable cause, and how the increasingly
deferential standard of review used to assess probable cause contributes
to the standard’s elusiveness. Part II also explores how probabilistic
evidence is currently incorporated into the probable cause inquiry. Part
III contends that certain evidence should demand quantified error rates
to establish probable cause. This section argues that statistical evidence is
necessary to establish probable cause for investigative techniques that
essentially replace a police officer’s own judgment, skill, and intuition.
Part III further analyzes how to calculate error rates in a way most
relevant to the probable cause inquiry and exposes the limitations of
quantification of evidence.
In the final section, the Article addresses how courts might
incorporate quantifiable evidence into the probable cause inquiry. In
cases in which quantifiable evidence is the critical factor in satisfying
probable cause, assigning a numerical value to probable cause would add
uniformity to the law and would better protect Fourth Amendment
interests. In cases where quantifiable evidence is presented along with
other qualitative evidence tending towards suspicion, judges can
19

Douglas A. Fretty, Face-Recognition Surveillance: A Moment of Truth for Fourth
Amendment Rights in Public Places, 16 Va. J.L. & Tech. 430, 459–62 (2011) (discussing
the “tolerable error” in the context of drug sniffing dogs, field sobriety tests, and facial recognition technology); Richard E. Myers II, Detector Dogs and Probable Cause, 14
Geo. Mason. L. Rev. 1, 12–18 (2006) (using Bayes’ Rule to demonstrate that a positive alert by a drug sniffing dog cannot be sufficient on its own to establish probable
cause).
20
E.g., Bruce A. Antkowiak, Saving Probable Cause, 40 Suffolk U. L. Rev.
569, 586 (2007) (“Mathematics . . . will fail us in our pursuit of a definition for probable cause, and, indeed, we should fear any attempt to co-opt mathematical concepts
to solve the probable cause riddle.”); Ronald J. Bacigal, Making the Right Gamble: The
Odds on Probable Cause, 74 Miss. L.J. 279, 338 (2004) (exploring the tension between
the precision of mathematics and the appeal of intuition in defining the probable
cause standard and creating a “tiered model of the levels of certainty required for
searches and seizures”); Joseph D. Grano, Probable Cause and Common Sense: A Reply to
the Critics of Illinois v. Gates, 17 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 465, 469 (1984) (preferring a
“commonsense approach to probable cause”); Kerr, supra note 5 (arguing that probable cause should not be quantified).
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qualitatively assess any suspicion created by a police officer’s
observational skills, but will know whether or not the quantifiable
evidence comes close to meeting the probable cause hurdle. Finally,
when quantifiable evidence is not presented as part of the probable cause
inquiry, judges can adhere to prior case law without quantifying the
inquiry. While confronting the arguments against quantifying probable
cause, the final section further offers insights into selecting a number
that is easy to conceptualize and proposes alternative solutions to
quantifying probable cause.
II. The Elusive Probable Cause Inquiry
“The overriding function of the Fourth Amendment is to protect
personal privacy and dignity against unwarranted intrusion by the
21
State.” The probable cause standard is so significant because it serves as
the gatekeeper between individuals and these unwarranted intrusions.
22
Yet, the standard has not been defined with sufficient precision. An
examination of the role that probable cause plays in regulating
governmental intrusions of various types is first necessary to understand
why probable cause requires flexibility in applying the facts but greater
precision in defining the legal standard.
The standard’s elusiveness is exacerbated by relatively recent
decisions diminishing judicial review of probable cause determinations.
Quantifying the standard is now a more urgently needed solution.
Although the Supreme Court has held that the probable cause standard is
incapable of quantification, courts already incorporate quantifiable
evidence into the inquiry; they are just not doing so in a standardized way.
A. Probable Cause as the Referee Between Privacy and Security
In the Fourth Amendment context, probable cause is particularly
important because it resolves particular issues in the ubiquitous tension
between individual liberty and public security/crime prevention. Serious
intrusions on privacy and liberty are unconstitutional when undertaken
without probable cause, and the evidence obtained as a result of the
23
intrusion is often suppressed at trial. If probable cause exists, however,
the need to protect the public and enforce the laws permits more serious
intrusions.
Probable cause serves as the referee between privacy and security
because the Fourth Amendment protects individuals only from

21

Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966).
See infra Part II.C.
23
The exclusionary rule requires that evidence obtained in violation of the
Fourth Amendment be excluded from admission at trial, although the exclusionary
rule has several exceptions. United States v. Pope, 467 F.3d 912, 916 (5th Cir. 2006)
(discussing the exclusionary rule and its “limits”).
22
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24

“unreasonable searches and seizures.” In defining whether a search or
arrest is reasonable, courts look to the degree of suspicion motivating the
police and the degree of intrusion into the individual’s privacy or liberty.
For full searches and arrests by the police, probable cause is usually the
25
requisite level of suspicion. To establish probable cause, police need not
demonstrate a certainty that criminal activity is afoot, or that evidence
will be found in a particular place, but only a “fair probability” of a
26
successful search or seizure. This fair probability remains a mystery, but
courts have consistently held that probable cause “exists if a law
enforcement official, on the basis of the totality of the circumstances, has
sufficient knowledge or reasonably trustworthy information to justify a
person of reasonable caution in believing that an offense has been or is
27
being committed.”
The most serious intrusions into an individual’s privacy require not
only probable cause but also the prior blessing of the courts. This court
intervention provides extra protection against unreasonable searches
because a neutral magistrate judge is deemed more capable of making a
probable cause determination than a police officer, who has a stake in
28
the outcome of each case. Searches or arrests that occur inside an
individual’s home require a magistrate judge to render the probable
29
cause determination and issue a warrant prior to the search or seizure.
Other types of searches are considered intrusive enough to require
probable cause, but exigencies or diminished expectations of privacy
render it unnecessary for the police to first obtain a warrant. The
“automobile exception” permits police to search a vehicle on a public

24

U.S. Const. amend. IV (emphasis added).
See United States v. $149,442.43 in U.S. Currency, 965 F.2d 868, 876
(10th Cir. 1992) (“The test for determining probable cause for forfeiture purposes is
the same as applies in arrests, searches and seizures.”).
26
See Walczyk v. Rio, 496 F.3d 139, 156–57 (2d Cir. 2007) (discussing the
probable cause standard).
27
United States v. Gagnon, 373 F.3d 230, 236 (2d Cir. 2004).
28
See Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 353 (1986) (“By requiring that conclusions concerning probable cause . . . ‘be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate
instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of
ferreting out crime,’ we minimize the risk of unreasonable assertions of executive authority.” (quoting Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948)) (citation omitted)).
29
See Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1865 (2011) (“In no quarter does
the Fourth Amendment apply with greater force than in our homes, our most private
space which, for centuries, has been regarded as ‘entitled to special protection.’”
(quoting Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 115 (2006))); Payton v. New York, 445
U.S. 573, 590 (1980) (“[T]he Fourth Amendment has drawn a firm line at the entrance to the house. Absent exigent circumstances, that threshold may not reasonably
be crossed without a warrant.”). The warrant clause of the Fourth Amendment provides that “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.” U.S. Const. amend. IV.
25
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30

road without a warrant, so long as probable cause is satisfied. Arrests in
31
public are permissible without a warrant. Police make these probable
cause determinations themselves, but they are reviewed later if evidence
32
found as a result of the search is used in a criminal trial.
B. The Role of Probable Cause When Less Suspicion Is Required
Although probable cause is the critical standard for the most
intrusive searches, there are other categories of searches and seizures
that are constitutionally permitted based on less suspicion or justification.
Even in these contexts, however, the probable cause standard is
important, either for setting the bar against which courts measure
“reasonable suspicion,” the level of suspicion needed for less intrusive
searches, or for preventing intrusions that are not considered searches
from becoming full searches.
A “reasonable suspicion” justifies brief detentions and superficial pat33
downs of individuals over their clothing, searches of students in public
34
35
schools, and searches of parolees’ homes. Because lesser degrees of
suspicion are also considered “not ‘readily, or even usefully, reduced to a
36
neat set of legal rules,’” courts define reasonable suspicion in relation to
probable cause. Reasonable suspicion requires some degree of certainty,
which is less than probable cause, and police must articulate the grounds
37
for that suspicion.
30

Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 466 (1999) (discussing the “automobile
exception to the warrant requirement”).
31
United States v. Garcia, 179 F.3d 265, 268 (5th Cir. 1999) (“[L]aw enforcement officials may arrest an individual in a public place without a warrant if they
have probable cause to believe that the individual committed a felony.”).
32
More information on how courts review probable cause determinations is
presented infra Part II.C.
33
United States v. Madrid, 30 F.3d 1269, 1275 (10th Cir. 1994) (discussing
a stop permitted by the Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), which “involv[es] only a brief, non-intrusive detention and frisk for weapons when officers have
a reasonable suspicion that the defendant has committed a crime or is about to do
so”).
34
Reynolds v. City of Anchorage, 379 F.3d 358, 370 (6th Cir. 2004) (“Under the ‘special needs’ doctrine, a search of a particular student, with the exception
of drug testing, must be supported by reasonable suspicion.”).
35
United States v. Loney, 331 F.3d 516, 520–21 (6th Cir. 2003) (“[I]t is now
beyond question that a state statute survives Fourth Amendment scrutiny if it authorizes searches of parolees based on a reasonable suspicion that an individual is violating the terms or conditions of parole.”).
36
United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989) (quoting Illinois v. Gates,
462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983)). In a 1981 survey, 164 federal judges provided responses
revealing that they quantified reasonable suspicion at an average certainty of 31%. See
C.M.A. McCauliff, Burdens of Proof: Degrees of Belief, Quanta of Evidence, or Constitutional
Guarantees?, 35 Vand. L. Rev. 1293, 1324–25, 1328 (1982).
37
See Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 7 (holding that the certainty needed to satisfy reasonable suspicion “is considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance
of the evidence” and less than the “fair probability” needed to satisfy probable cause).
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Other types of government intrusions, due to heightened
governmental interests or diminished privacy interests, either require no
individualized suspicion or are not even considered searches that
38
implicate Fourth Amendment protections. In those cases, the probable
cause inquiry prevents the police from converting a superficial intrusion
into a greater intrusion.
One category of non-search that has great import for the probable
cause inquiry, because it yields results that are usually more susceptible to
quantification, is the so-called “binary search.” A binary search reveals
39
only the presence or absence of illegal substances. The Supreme Court
has held that individuals do not have a legitimate expectation of privacy
in contraband, so intrusions that reveal only the presence or absence of
drugs, if conducted in ways that do not seriously implicate privacy
interests or physically intrude upon constitutionally protected areas, do
40
not trigger Fourth Amendment scrutiny. When an agent of the Drug
Enforcement Administration tested a small amount of white powder for
41
cocaine, for example, it was not considered a search or a seizure. The
police may also use drug sniffing dogs to search for scents in public
42
places, such as outside a vehicle during a lawful traffic stop or the
43
exterior of luggage at an airport, without triggering the Fourth
Amendment.
The major intrusion to privacy from using binary technology occurs
after the technology has produced a positive alert. Police either conduct
a full search themselves or obtain a warrant from a magistrate judge on
the basis of the positive alert, but probable cause must be satisfied. Thus,
the Fourth Amendment Analysis requires the judge to determine
whether the positive alert provides the police with probable cause to
In Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990), the Supreme Court explained that reasonable suspicion can be established with information that is different in quantity and
less reliable than that required to show probable cause.
38
See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 657 (1995) (upholding
school’s suspicionless testing of student athletes); Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von
Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 677 (1989) (upholding mandatory urinalysis tests of employees
who work for the United States Customs Service).
39
The term “binary” refers to the fact that the search reveals either a “yes” or
a “no” answer to the question of whether illegal substances are present and does not
reveal any other potentially personal information. Simmons, supra note 14, at 413.
40
Binary searches may trigger Fourth Amendment scrutiny if performed in
a physically intrusive way. See Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1415–17 (2013).
41
United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 123 (1984) (“A chemical test that
merely discloses whether or not a particular substance is cocaine does not compromise any legitimate interest in privacy.”).
42
Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409 (2005).
43
United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983) (“[W]e conclude that the
particular course of investigation that the agents intended to pursue here—exposure
of respondent’s luggage, which was located in a public place, to a trained canine—
did not constitute a ‘search’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”). Part of
the rationale in Place was that a sniff of a closed suitcase did not reveal the contents of
that suitcase, and was therefore minimally intrusive. Id. at 706–07.
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44

search further. A “false positive” alert to an area that does not contain
drugs may ultimately reveal items and information in which individuals
do have a legitimate expectation of privacy, and forces individuals to
45
submit to prolonged interaction with the police.
The probable cause standard thus protects the public from serious
intrusions upon privacy, sets a standard against which reasonable
suspicion is measured, and prevents binary searches from automatically
becoming full-scale searches. However, at all levels of review, the level of
confidence needed to satisfy the probable cause standard is unknown,
rendering it vulnerable to erosion and abuse.
C. Uncertainty in the Probable Cause Standard Throughout the Stages of Review
46

Currently, courts apply a “nontechnical conception” of probable
cause at all levels of review, allowing for flexibility in application of the
standard but providing little guidance for police officers and magistrate
judges. The result is, as one scholar noted, that “[a]lthough the Court
has stressed the importance of a ‘single uniform standard’ of probable
cause for criminal investigatory conduct, it has not defined that standard
in a manner that is particularly illuminating to those charged with
47
enforcing and interpreting the criminal law.” Relatively recent
developments in Fourth Amendment law have compounded this
problem because they have undermined judicial review of probable cause
determinations, making it even more necessary to clarify the standard.
As mentioned above, law enforcement officers must make practical
commonsense judgments in areas of uncertainty, when they do not know
if a suspect is actually committing a crime. Because police officers are
48
not, as the Supreme Court often reminds us, “legal technicians,” the
probable cause standard must allow police officers to make educated
guesses. If such a guess is reasonable but incorrect, and the police
ultimately find either no evidence of the criminal activity they were
49
looking for or evidence of entirely unrelated criminal activity, then the

44
A false positive occurs when the search technology indicates the presence
of criminal activity incorrectly. For a more detailed explanation, see infra Part III.C.
45
For this reason, Justice Souter dissented in Caballes, which held that the
use of drug sniffing dogs at routine traffic stops is not a search. 543 U.S. at 411 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“The infallible dog, however, is a creature of legal fiction.”).
46
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949).
47
Barry Jeffrey Stern, Warrants Without Probable Cause, 59 Brook. L. Rev.
1385, 1436–37 n.172 (1994) (citation omitted). Professor Ronald Bacigal had described probable cause as a “fixed, but undefined, percentage.” Bacigal, supra note
20, at 324.
48
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 231 (1983).
49
See United States v. Biglow, 562 F.3d 1272, 1281 (10th Cir. 2009) (“Probable cause ‘requires only a probability or substantial chance of criminal activity,’ rather than an actual showing of such activity.” (quoting New York v. P.J. Video, Inc.,
475 U.S. 868, 877–78 (1986))).
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standard must also provide room for courts to defer to a police officer’s
50
51
expertise, but prevent unreasonable intrusions.
To accommodate the myriad interactions between police and
individuals without creating rules that unduly stifle a police officer’s
exercise of her intuition, courts generally assess probable cause given the
52
totality of the circumstances. This flexibility allows courts to take all of
the facts into account and make an intuitive judgment when issuing a
warrant or upholding a search instead of having to strictly adhere to rigid
53
rules about what constitutes probable cause. For example, the totalityof-the-circumstances test that governs whether an informant’s tip can
supply probable cause balances factors like the reliability of the
informant, the basis for the informant’s information, and the extent to
54
which the police have corroborated the tip. A judge may disregard the
fact that a confidential informant’s criminal record or drug addiction
undermines her reliability if other factors point towards her
55
truthfulness. There are many ways to interpret the same set of facts, and
an innocent explanation for the evidence presented does not necessarily
56
negate probable cause.
57
With great flexibility, however, comes great uncertainty. The
Supreme Court has remarked that “[r]easonable minds frequently may
differ on the question whether a particular [warrant] affidavit establishes

50
Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 700 (1996) (“[O]ur cases have
recognized that a police officer may draw inferences based on his own experience in
deciding whether probable cause exists.”). According to the Supreme Court in Ornelas, where a layperson might conclude that a “loose panel below the back seat armrest in [an] automobile . . . may suggest only wear and tear, . . . to [a police officer],
who had searched roughly 2,000 cars for narcotics, it suggested that drugs may be secreted inside the panel.” Id.
51
See supra Part II.A.
52
See Gates, 462 U.S. at 238.
53
Professor Ronald Bacigal noted that scholars opposed to prescribing
precise mathematical rules to govern the probable cause inquiry “prefer to trust the
subjective judgment of experienced decision makers who evaluate each individual
situation in light of accumulated experience” and “rely on perceptions that they cannot articulate as explicit rules or mathematical probabilities.” Bacigal, supra note 20,
at 305.
54
Gates, 462 U.S. at 230–34.
55
United States v. McKinney, 919 F.2d 405, 415 (7th Cir. 1990) (“The magistrate was thus presented with specific details of a crime; neither Brown’s drug addiction nor criminal record warranted disregarding her report. Although an informant’s
reliability is a factor to be considered by a court, it is just one relevant consideration
in the totality of the circumstances analysis.”).
56
United States v. Fama, 758 F.2d 834, 838 (2d Cir. 1985).
57
See Bacigal, supra note 20, at 339 (discussing the “unacceptable complexity of balancing the totality of the circumstances”). See generally Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 2009: Twenty-Third Annual Survey, 58 Am. J.
Comp. L. 227, 238 (2010) (“The tension between the need for legal certainty and
predictability, on the one hand, and the desire for flexible, equitable, individualized
solutions on the other, is as old as law itself.”).
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58

probable cause.” Scholars have noted “wildly different outcomes” based
on similar fact patterns when determining probable cause and
59
reasonable suspicion. Part of the problem is that no one knows how
high a hurdle the standard actually presents. The Supreme Court
explicitly refuses to assign probable cause a numerical value, equating it
60
instead to a “fair probability” that evidence will be found. Judges,
scholars, and practitioners hold varying views as to the burden imposed
by probable cause, with the largest number of judges clustering in the
61
range between 30% and 60%. Disagreement among scholars and
practitioners even exists as to whether probable cause is a lighter or
62
equivalent burden to the preponderance of the evidence standard.
The recognition that reasonable minds may easily differ on whether
probable cause is satisfied often makes reviewing courts loathe to secondguess probable cause determinations by either the police or magistrate
58

United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 914 (1984).
Margaret Raymond, Down on the Corner, Out in the Street: Considering the
Character of the Neighborhood in Evaluating Reasonable Suspicion, 60 Ohio St. L.J. 99,
121–22 (1999) (“In a high crime area, sitting in a car in a parking lot late at night
may create reasonable suspicion [to detain someone] in Georgia, but not in
Tennessee, and standing on a street corner may create reasonable suspicion in
Louisiana, but not in Pennsylvania, even though these jurisdictions apply the same
standard.” (footnotes omitted)).
60
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 235, 238 (1983); see Florida v. Harris, 133
S. Ct. 1050, 1055 (2013).
61
In the survey of federal judges in 1981, mentioned supra note 36, 166
provided responses revealing that they quantify “probable cause to believe,” on
average, at 45.78%. Two judges even associated probable cause with 10% and one
judge with 90%. See McCauliff, supra note 36, at 1324–25, 1327. Most of the judges
believed probable cause was around 40% or 50%, but 52 of the judges thought
probable cause was either around 30% or around 60%. Id. at 1327.
62
See, e.g., 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the
Fourth Amendment § 3.2(e), at 60–64 (3d ed. 1996) (discussing cases and commentaries indicating that probable cause does not mean “more-probable-than-not”); John
H. Blume et al., Every Juror Wants a Story: Narrative Relevance, Third Party Guilt and the
Right To Present a Defense, 44 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1069, 1104 n.240 (2007) (“Probable
cause does not mean more probable than not.”); Christopher Slobogin, Government
Data Mining and the Fourth Amendment, 75 U. Chi. L. Rev. 317, 329 (2008) (describing
probable cause as “a level of certainty akin to the civil preponderance standard”);
Kimberly A. Burdge, Comment, Legislating the Fourth Amendment: Can Congressional Legislation Make the Unconstitutional Legal?, 50 How. L.J. 899, 901 (2007) (“[A] more detailed, modern version of probable cause would not necessarily require a more likely
than not scenario.”). One particular federal prosecutor told his supervisee that probable cause meant 40%, Lawrence Rosenthal, The Crime Drop and the Fourth Amendment:
Toward an Empirical Jurisprudence of Search and Seizure, 29 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change
641, 680 (2005), but an attorney for the FBI believed that “probable cause
mean[t] . . . more likely than not, or if quantified, a 51% likelihood,” Daniel Richman,
Prosecutors and Their Agents, Agents and Their Prosecutors, 103 Colum. L. Rev. 749, 783
(2003) (quoting Memorandum from Coleen Rowley to Robert Mueller, FBI Director
(May 21, 2002)). A plurality of the Supreme Court has stated that the probable cause
standard “does not demand any showing that such a belief [of criminal wrongdoing] be
correct or more likely true than false.” Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742 (1983).
59
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63

judges. This has led to increasingly deferential review of probable cause
decisions, which then in turn contributes to the elusiveness of the
probable cause standard. For example, in the case of searches where a
warrant is required, the police affidavit must contain information
allowing a person of reasonable caution to believe that evidence will be
64
found in the place to be searched. Then, the magistrate judge must find
that, “given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit . . . there is a
fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a
65
particular place.” Great deference is later given to the magistrate’s
66
issuance of a warrant by a reviewing court, which determines whether
67
the magistrate’s decision is supported by “a substantial basis.”
This deference, combined with a vague standard, does not promote
68
uniformity in magistrate judges’ decisions. The deference might be
appropriate if reviewing courts were simply deferring to a magistrate
judge’s assessment as to whether the facts at issue, based on the totality of
the circumstances, surpassed a known probable cause threshold.
However, because the probable cause hurdle is so vague, reviewing courts
cannot know the degree of suspicion on which the magistrate judge
69
relied in issuing a warrant. Is that magistrate basing his ruling on the
63
See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 914 (1984) (holding that a
magistrate’s issuance of a warrant is entitled to “great deference” due to the strong
preference for warrants and the reality of “doubtful or marginal case[s]” (quoting
Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 419 (1969))); United States v. Ventresca, 380
U.S. 102, 106 (1965)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
64
See United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 593 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
65
Gates, 462 U.S. at 238.
66
See United States v. Allen, 625 F.3d 830, 840 (5th Cir. 2010) (“A magistrate’s
determination of probable cause is entitled to great deference by reviewing courts.”).
67
Id. In Allen, the court made clear that the duty of a reviewing court is
simply to ensure that the magistrate had a “substantial basis for concluding that
probable cause existed.” Id. at 834; see, e.g., United States v. McClellan, 350 F. App’x
767, 769 (3d Cir. 2009) (“Our review of the initial probable cause determination,
however, is deferential as we scrutinize the affidavit to determine if ‘there is a substantial basis for a fair probability’ that the wiretaps would obtain communications
regarding illegal drug transactions.” (quoting United States v. Conley, 4 F.3d 1200,
1205 (3d Cir. 1993))); United States v. Reed, 195 F. App’x 815, 822 (10th Cir. 2006)
(“A reviewing court should accord great deference to a magistrate’s determination of
probable cause; its duty is ‘simply to ensure that the magistrate had a substantial basis
for . . . conclud[ing] that probable cause existed.’ This deference is appropriate to
further the Fourth Amendment’s strong preference for warrants.” (quoting Gates, 462
U.S. at 238–39) (citation omitted)).
68
The Supreme Court has warned against too much deference to a trial
court’s probable cause determination, remarking that “[a] policy of sweeping deference would permit, ‘[i]n the absence of any significant difference in the facts,’ ‘the
Fourth Amendment’s incidence [to] tur[n] on whether different trial judges draw
general conclusions that the facts are sufficient or insufficient to constitute probable
cause.’ Such varied results would be inconsistent with the idea of a unitary system of
law.” Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 697 (1996) (quoting Brinegar, 338 U.S.
160, 171 (1949)) (citation omitted).
69
In his excellent piece on the tension between a statistical versus an intuitive
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fact that a reasonable officer has to believe that evidence will be found by
greater than 50%, and a “fair probability” determination by the
magistrate judge allows for some room for disagreement among
70
reasonable police officers? Reviewing courts, which decide whether a
71
“substantial basis” supports the magistrate’s decision, do not even know
how much suspicion the magistrate believed was required before
rendering his decision.
The probable cause standard’s imprecision at various levels of review
is also partially responsible for the “good-faith exception” to the
72
exclusionary rule, which, in turn, contributes to the indeterminacy of
the standard. Although the exclusionary rule requires the “fruits” of
unlawful searches to be suppressed at trial, the good faith exception
permits the admission of evidence found pursuant to a search warrant
not supported by probable cause, so long as law enforcement reasonably
73
relied on the warrant. A reviewing court can therefore find under
certain circumstances that even if a substantial basis did not exist for the
magistrate’s determination, any evidence found may still form the basis
74
of a criminal conviction. The good faith exception means all evidence
found pursuant to a warrant will be admitted unless the warrant is “so
lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its
75
existence entirely unreasonable.”
The good faith exception thus almost entirely insulates a magistrate
judge’s issuance of a warrant from review at the trial or appellate levels.
Many reviewing courts simply find that the good faith exception applies
approach to probable cause, Ronald Bacigal argues that the Supreme Court has
maintained the “fiction” that probable cause is a “single, familiar standard” that
applies equally to every crime. Bacigal, supra note 20, at 323–24 (quoting Dunaway v.
New York, 422 U.S. 200, 213 (1979)). According to Bacigal, “[t]his rigid view of
probable cause requires the police to pinpoint their level of certainty to some fixed,
but undefined, percentage.” Id.
70
At least one court has even conflated the standards at various levels of
review, holding that probable cause exists if a reasonable person could “believe there
is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime would be found in a particular place.” United States v. Fladten, 230 F.3d 1083, 1085 (8th Cir. 2000).
71
See supra Part I.
72
Police are permitted to rely on a search warrant, even if later found lacking in probable cause, where a search warrant affidavit “provided evidence sufficient
to create disagreement among thoughtful and competent judges as to the existence
of probable cause.” United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 926 (1984).
73
The Supreme Court has held that the good faith exception does not
apply to a search warrant if the police lied to procure the warrant, or the warrant was
so lacking in probable cause that the magistrate judge essentially rubber-stamped a
warrant request. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 921–24 (“Penalizing the officer for the
magistrate’s error, rather than his own, cannot logically contribute to the deterrence
of Fourth Amendment violations.”).
74
United States v. Bynum, 293 F.3d 192, 195 (4th Cir. 2002) (allowing the
admission of evidence even if “it is clear that . . . Agent Peterson’s affidavit does not
provide a substantial basis for determining the existence of probable cause”).
75
Id. (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 923) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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without considering whether the warrant was supported by probable
76
cause. This stymies the development of the law surrounding the
probable cause standard in favor of admission of a great deal more
77
evidence. Given that the review of a magistrate judge’s probable cause
determination is already so deferential, it is difficult to determine in a
particular case if probable cause is actually lacking unless it is so
obviously lacking that a court must exclude the evidence despite the
good faith exception.
Although Leon’s exception applies only in the warrant context, one
scholar has found that searches conducted pursuant to warrants are
much more likely to produce evidence than searches conducted where
78
79
no warrant is required. Leon’s good faith exception, and its progeny,
80
may lead to an erosion of the extra protections that warrants offer. The
good faith exception focuses on what a reasonable officer would believe,
not whether the probable cause standard was actually met based on the
81
warrant application, thereby bypassing the magistrate’s oversight as
intermediary between law enforcement’s own determination of probable
82
cause and the resulting search.
Unscrupulous or overextended police officers and magistrate judges
can easily exploit the uncertainty in the probable cause standard,
76

E.g., United States v. Houston, 665 F.3d 991, 994 (8th Cir. 2012) (“A
court may consider whether the good-faith exception applies before conducting
probable cause analysis.”).
77
Indeed, as the dissent in Leon predicted, “After today’s decisions, there
will be little reason for reviewing courts to conduct such a conscientious review [of
the probable cause determination]; rather, these courts will be more likely to focus
simply on the question of police good faith.” Leon, 468 U.S. at 956–57 n.15 (Brennan,
J., dissenting).
78
One scholar examined available empirical data to conclude that searches
pursuant to warrants recover evidence at rates that may exceed 80%. The recovery
rate on warrantless searches, even when police allege probable cause, is significantly
less, perhaps as low as 12%. Max Minzner, Putting Probability Back Into Probable Cause,
87 Tex. L. Rev. 913, 923–24 (2009).
79
E.g., Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135 (2009) (extending Leon’s
good faith exception to a situation where police negligence led to an arrest pursuant
to a revoked warrant).
80
See, e.g., Houston, 665 F.3d at 995–96 (upholding police officers’ reliance
on a search warrant based on the “common sense appeal” of the inference that
because defendant molested a child and looked at child pornography six years ago,
he might have child pornography on his current computer at a different location
(quoting United States v. Perry, 531 F.3d 662, 665 (8th Cir. 2008))).
81
In fact, in applying the good faith exception, some courts consider information known to the police officer that was inadvertently omitted from the warrant application. See United States v. McKenzie-Gude, 671 F.3d 452, 460–61 (4th Cir.
2011).
82
See United States v. McKinney, 919 F.2d 405, 413 (7th Cir. 1990) (discussing the “far less reliable procedure of an after-the-event justification for the arrest or
search, too likely to be subtly influenced by the familiar shortcomings of hindsight
judgment” (quoting Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96 (1964) (internal quotation mark
omitted))).
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especially when combined with the exceptional deference offered to the
83
initial probable cause determination. Given the lack of oversight over
probable cause decisions, the flexibility afforded by the current
application of the probable cause standard may not always be a virtue,
and may place too much discretion in the hands of police officers at the
84
expense of privacy interests. According to Professor Ronald Bacigal,
“[t]he inability to formulate clear rules or precise probability levels
governing probable cause has lead [sic] the Court to adopt one overarching rule for the police—just use your common sense and act
85
reasonably.” To some extent, this standard contravenes the purpose of
86
the Fourth Amendment, which is to limit police discretion. Although
reasonableness is part of the standard, an undefined legal hurdle leads to
variability in how much suspicion is deemed “reasonable,” allowing for
perhaps unjustified amounts of police discretion.
While there is ample reason to allow great flexibility in application of
the facts to the probable cause standard, there is less justification for
preserving a vague, undefined legal standard. This is especially true
because courts are already incorporating probabilities into the probable
cause inquiry.
D. Confrontations with Probability
Part of the reason that courts are loathe to attach rules or numbers
to the probable cause inquiry is a concern that a “probabilistic” approach
to probable cause would replace detective work that yields individualized
87
suspicion. This type of probabilistic approach, some fear, would
83

Although many scholars assume that most police officers would not
abuse their power to establish probable cause, empirical evidence indicates a serious
problem with perjury in warrant affidavits. See Stephen W. Gard, Bearing False Witness:
Perjured Affidavits and the Fourth Amendment, 41 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 445, 447–48 (2008).
Clarifying the probable cause standard or applying a more stringent standard of
review would not solve the problem of perjury, but it would impede police attempts
to establish probable cause where none exists, which police might prefer to outright
lying.
84
Scholars have commented that the cynical explanation for flexible or inconsistent Fourth Amendment standards is to make it easier for police to conduct
searches without worrying about constitutional protections. E.g., Susan F. Mandiberg,
Reasonable Officers vs. Reasonable Lay Persons in the Supreme Court’s Miranda and Fourth
Amendment Cases, 14 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 1481, 1525 (2010) (“So why should police
not be held to higher standards suitable to the trained professionals they presumably
are? . . . The cynical answer is that lower courts would be more likely to find a Fourth
Amendment or Miranda violation if police were held to a higher standard . . . than is
currently the case.”).
85
Bacigal, supra note 20, at 318.
86
Id. at 320.
87
See id. at 297 (“An unavoidable feature of probabilistic thinking is that it
treats people as members of a group rather than as individuals. Some commentators
suggest that this focus violates an ethical command to treat citizens as unique individuals and to judge them only on evidence about their own conduct or matters within their
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penalize people based on group attributes instead of individual
88
characteristics. Yet, this is not the only way probabilities have been
incorporated into the probable cause inquiry. Courts also review
probabilities relevant to individualized suspicion, which is not as
problematic as finding probable cause based on group statistics. These
two types of probabilistic evidence—data that measures group attributes
and data that gives rise to individualized suspicion—have different roles
in the probable cause inquiry, and both illustrate how courts evaluate
statistical evidence in assessing probable cause.
1. Background Attributes and Group Statistics
Many courts and scholars have expressed an aversion to using nonindividualized statistical information to sanction intrusive police conduct
89
or treat people as potential criminals. For example, presence in a highcrime area is not sufficient by itself to justify stopping an individual on
the theory that most people in that area are engaged in criminal
90
activity. Courts do not want to punish individuals for where they live, or
91
for the demographic groups to which they belong. However, presence
in a high-crime area can be considered as a relevant factor in
determining whether the police have reasonable suspicion, a lower
92
93
hurdle than probable cause, to briefly detain someone.
It is in such situations that courts consider group statistics on
criminality within an area. Although one article has noted that most
courts are content to rely on “an officer’s testimony that an area is a
‘high-crime area’ without much analysis as to the basis of that
own control.”); see also William J. Stuntz, Local Policing After the Terror, 111 Yale L.J. 2137,
2164 (2002) (“Current Fourth Amendment law discourages group seizures. . . . Aggregate justifications—[where] no one person is reasonably suspected, but the odds are
high that some members of the group are criminals—do not suffice.”).
88
See Bacigal, supra note 20, at 295–97; see also David A. Harris, Using Race or
Ethnicity as a Factor in Assessing the Reasonableness of Fourth Amendment Activity: Description, Yes; Prediction, No, 73 Miss. L.J. 423, 451 (2003) (“Group guilt can be both immensely powerful and deeply troubling when used to punish people or focus suspicion on them merely for their associations.”).
89
E.g., United States v. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1129–30, 1138
(9th Cir. 2000); see Raymond, supra note 59, at 105–06 (discussing a hypothetical
where one in three individuals in a certain area is likely to possess drugs and arguing
that, although this probability likely satisfies reasonable suspicion, “reasonable suspicion would not exist as to each individual in the neighborhood”). According to Raymond, “[s]ome particularized observations—proof that implicates an identified individual—must also be offered in support of the claim of reasonable suspicion.” Id. at
106 (footnote omitted).
90
Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52 (1979) (“The fact that appellant was in a
neighborhood frequented by drug users, standing alone, is not a basis for concluding
that appellant himself was engaged in criminal conduct.”).
91
See generally Raymond, supra note 59.
92
See supra Part II.B.
93
See Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000) (“[O]fficers are not required to ignore the relevant characteristics of a location in determining whether the
circumstances are sufficiently suspicious to warrant further investigation.”).
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94

conclusion,” some courts have required prosecutors to provide
95
quantitative evidence demonstrating the existence of a high-crime area.
Courts must then review statistical evidence on whether a particular
location is either a high-crime area or undergoing a crime wave with
96
respect to the criminal activity at issue.
Courts have also examined group statistics when assessing the
efficacy of random searches and seizures that do not require a showing of
probable cause, to determine whether these intrusions are reasonable.
Sobriety roadblocks, airport screening programs, and the practice of
ordering motorists to exit their vehicle during traffic stops have all been
assessed using percentages of criminal activity found per search or
97
98
seizure. In Delaware v. Prouse, the Supreme Court invalidated random
stops made by the Delaware Highway Patrol in part because “no empirical
evidence indicated that such stops would be an effective means of
99
promoting roadway safety.” Later, distinguishing Prouse, the Supreme
Court upheld a sobriety checkpoint pilot program where “the detention
of [each of] the 126 vehicles that entered the checkpoint resulted in the
arrest of two drunken drivers. Stated as a percentage, approximately 1.6
percent of the drivers passing through the checkpoint were arrested for
100
alcohol impairment.”
It is important to note that statistics that measure the likelihood of
criminality within a certain group, like the ones mentioned above, are
usually insufficient to satisfy probable cause, which is a much higher bar
than reasonable suspicion. Satisfying probable cause almost always
101
requires some individualized suspicion. As one court of appeals held,
94
Andrew Guthrie Ferguson & Damien Bernache, The “High-Crime Area”
Question: Requiring Verifiable and Quantifiable Evidence for Fourth Amendment Reasonable
Suspicion Analysis, 57 Am. U. L. Rev. 1587, 1607 (2008).
95
E.g., United States v. Bonner, 363 F.3d 213, 216 (3d Cir. 2004) (finding
not “clearly erroneous” the district court’s determination that a location could not be
categorized as a high-crime area where “an average of 1.3 arrests [were made] per
week [near the place of the stop], and that most of the arrests were for misdemeanors
and summary offenses” due to the large number of people who frequent the area);
United States v. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1139 n.32 (9th Cir. 2000) (requiring district courts to “examine with care the specific data underlying any such assertion” of the existence of a high-crime area). For a detailed analysis of how courts have
attempted to standardize quantification of statistics relevant to the existence of a
high-crime area, see Ferguson & Bernache, supra note 94, at 1607–23.
96
See United States v. Wright, 485 F.3d 45, 53–54 (1st Cir. 2007) (articulating the test for determining if a neighborhood’s crime profile can contribute to reasonable suspicion).
97
Bacigal, supra note 20, at 311–14.
98
440 U.S. 648 (1979).
99
Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 454 (1990) (distinguishing Prouse).
100
Id. at 454–55. The Court also relied on data from other states that “on the
whole, sobriety checkpoints resulted in drunken driving arrests of around 1 percent of
all motorists stopped.” Id. at 455.
101
Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 313 (1997).
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“[s]tanding alone, a high incidence of child molestation by persons
convicted of child pornography crimes may not demonstrate that a child
102
molester is likely to possess child pornography.”
2. Error Rates and Individualized Suspicion
When probable cause is the requisite standard, courts often assess
statistical evidence to indicate a likelihood of criminality particular to an
individual suspect. Devices such as drug sniffing dogs and fingerprint
analysis are used by police to generate suspicion specific to an individual.
Instead of using statistics to determine how likely it is that individuals in a
group are criminals, statistical evidence here quantifies the error rates of
investigative tools that indicate whether a particular individual is behaving
criminally. The quantification of error rates for such devices, therefore,
does not ascribe guilt to any class of individuals or otherwise violate the
notion that probable cause must be based on individualized suspicion.
For example, quantitative data has been used to assess the reliability
of tipsters in providing the police with accurate information about
criminal activity, based on how many tips lead to the discovery of criminal
103
activity. In fact, some courts have held that “[w]hen an informant has a
proven track record for providing reliable information, corroboration of
104
the information he provides is not necessarily essential.” However,
courts have not quantified in a standardized way what constitutes a
reliable track record, likely because the nature of the information
matters more than the bare percentage of times an informant has given
105
accurate information.
Statistical data is also used to bolster the demonstration of probable
106
cause in cases where a binary search leads to a full search. This is a
particularly salient issue in the context of drug sniffing dogs, who are
constitutionally permitted to sniff the outside of an individual’s vehicle or
107
suitcase in a public place without any suspicion. Courts must then
determine if a drug sniffing dog’s positive alert provided the police with

102

United States v. Hodson, 543 F.3d 286, 293 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting
United States v. Adkins, 169 F. App’x 961, 967 (6th Cir. 2006)) (internal quotation
marks omitted). As another example, courts have held that merely finding drugs in a
defendant’s car does not lead to probable cause that he has drugs in his house. E.g.,
State v. Kahn, 555 N.W.2d 15, 19 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996).
103
E.g., United States v. Shepherd, 714 F.2d 316, 317 (4th Cir. 1983)
(“[O]n approximately thirty earlier occasions the informant had provided information that had led to over twenty-five convictions.”).
104
United States v. Smith, 182 F.3d 473, 479 (6th Cir. 1999).
105
See United States v. Bynum, 293 F.3d 192, 203 (4th Cir. 2002) (“The bar
for establishing an informant’s veracity through references to his track record is not
high. For example, courts have uniformly held that an informant’s veracity is adequately established when the affiant asserts that the informant has supplied information leading to arrests and convictions.”).
106
See supra Part II.A.
107
Id.
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probable cause to search an area. Prior to Florida v. Harris, as one
scholar noted, the Supreme Court had “not yet addressed the specific
qualifications that a ‘trained canine’ possesses . . . [or] questioned the
accuracy record of a particular canine in practice. As a result, lower
courts have attempted to fill the gap and determine when a canine alert
109
may be accepted as reliable.”
In a decision that was recently reversed in Harris, the Florida
Supreme Court held that “field performance records” and evidence
regarding the dog handler’s training must be considered when a judge
110
assesses whether a dog’s positive alert provided probable cause. Many
courts across the country have also examined a drug sniffing dog’s
111
“accuracy rate” in determining whether the dog’s positive alert satisfied
112
the probable cause standard. However, some courts have held that
113
accuracy rates are not essential to the probable cause determination.
Police in those jurisdictions may simply demonstrate that the dog that

108

133 S. Ct. 1050 (2013).
Robert C. Bird, An Examination of the Training and Reliability of the Narcotics Detection Dog, 85 Ky. L.J. 405, 417 (1996–1997).
110
Harris v. State, 71 So. 3d 756, 775 (Fla. 2011), overruled by Harris, 133
S. Ct. 1050 (2013).
111
Accuracy rates are usually measured by dividing the number of times
drugs were found after a particular dog alerted to their presence by the number of
times that dog alerted to the presence of drugs. For a full analysis on how error rates
should be measured and the issues that arise when compiling statistics in the context
of drug sniffing dogs, see infra Part III.B.
112
E.g., United States v. Anderson, 367 F. App’x 30, 33 (11th Cir. 2010)
(holding that a canine alert was sufficient to establish probable cause where, “[e]ven
assuming [defendant]’s view of the statistics, Aron [the dog] had a 55% accuracy rate
in finding measurable amounts of drugs”); United States v. Kennedy, 131 F.3d 1371,
1378 (10th Cir. 1997) (holding that “a 70–80% success rate [by the drug detection
dog Bobo] meets the liberal standard for probable cause established in Gates”); United States v. Scarborough, 128 F.3d 1373, 1378 (10th Cir. 1997) (“The affidavit states
that [the dog] Pogo is certified, was trained to alert to drug odors . . . and had alerted
approximately 65 times to controlled substances and contraband in four-and-one-half
years on the job. Drugs were not found five of those times—for an overall reliability
rate of 92 percent.”); United States v. Huerta, 247 F. Supp. 2d 902, 910 (S.D. Ohio
2002) (holding that the court was “unwilling to conclude that [the dog] Abby’s alert
on the van, alone, established probable cause to search that vehicle” when Abby had
an approximately 65% success rate); Commonwealth v. Ramos, 894 N.E.2d 611, 613–
14 (Mass. App. Ct. 2008) (holding that probable cause was not satisfied where, in the
past four-and-a-half years, the dog had only five to six correct alerts and two false
alerts).
113
See, e.g., United States v. Diaz, 25 F.3d 392, 394–96 (6th Cir. 1994) (holding that evidence of training and certification was sufficient but evidence of the dog’s
performance was admissible on the issue of “credibility” of the dog); United States v.
Venema, 563 F.2d 1003, 1007 (10th Cir. 1977) (holding that an affidavit describing
Chane as a “trained, certified marijuana sniffing dog” was sufficient to give police
probable cause to obtain a warrant to search “defendant’s locker in the Poco Storage
Company”).
109
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114

made the positive alert is well trained and certified, and sometimes do
115
not even need to show that.
In Harris, the Supreme Court rejected the idea that a “checklist” of
evidence, including field accuracy rates, was necessary to establish
116
probable cause. A unanimous Court concluded that lower courts may
consider the totality of the evidence presented in favor of a dog’s
reliability, and should particularly rely on a dog’s certification with a
117
legitimate training company. The Court’s conclusion was partially
based on the fact that certification organizations require dogs to be
tested in controlled, simulated environments. As discussed in Part IV.B,
this reliance on controlled testing over recordkeeping of field accuracy
rates relies on the mistaken assumption that data on false positive rates is
particularly helpful in answering the probable cause inquiry.
Whether by trusting false positive data or when conducting a more
rigorous scrutiny of other binary devices, courts increasingly recognize
the need to rely on quantifiable evidence relevant to individualized
suspicion when conducting a probable cause inquiry. The Supreme
Court’s resistance to quantifying probable cause, however, has resulted in
assessments of probabilistic evidence that are non-uniform and
haphazard. Questions concerning which evidence should be quantified,
how to best quantify that evidence, and how to interpret the statistics,
remain largely unresolved. Resolution of these questions is essential to
bringing uniformity to the probable cause inquiry and protecting against
118
unreasonable searches.
III. Quantifying Evidence Relevant to Probable Cause
The vices of a vague probable cause standard, including the lack of
clarity and susceptibility to abuse mentioned above, are not outweighed
by its virtues when law enforcement replaces investigative techniques that
harness a police officer’s expertise or judgment with nonhuman tools or

114
See Lewis R. Katz & Aaron P. Golembiewski, Curbing the Dog: Extending the
Protection of the Fourth Amendment to Police Drug Dogs, 85 Neb. L. Rev. 735, 761 (2007)
(“Often, courts are willing to accept assertions of the dog’s training and certification
as prima facie evidence of a dog’s accuracy.”); see also id. at 761 n.96 (citing United
States v. Berry, 90 F.3d 148, 153 (6th Cir. 1996); Venema, 563 F.2d at 1007; United
States v. Stanley, 4 F. App’x 148, 150 (4th Cir. 2001)).
115
See United States v. Williams, 69 F.3d 27, 28 (5th Cir. 1995) (per curiam)
(holding that “[t]he fact that the dog alerted provided probable cause to search”
even in the absence of a showing of training and reliability).
116
Florida v. Harris, 133 S. Ct. 1050, 1056 (2013).
117
Id. at 1056–57.
118
Although the Supreme Court, in deciding Florida v. Harris, missed an
opportunity to properly ensure that a drug sniffing dog’s alert is sufficiently reliable
to establish probable cause under the Fourth Amendment, state legislatures can create laws that require more evidence of reliability, or more record-keeping of a dog’s
field accuracy rate.
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119

Despite their perceived precision, investigative
forensic methods.
techniques that rely on forensic analysis or mechanized devices are
120
fallible. Indeed, techniques such as drug sniffing dogs, fingerprint
121
122
123
analysis, facial recognition technology, DNA matching, and child124
pornography-detecting software have variable rates of error, depending
on the quality of the tool being used and the skill of the human
125
operator. There is a growing literature on the unreliability of positive
119

Police are increasingly investing in binary search technology, described
supra Part II.A, because in many cases, no suspicion is required to conduct a binary
search. Michael Bell, Note, Caballes, Place, and Economic Rin-tin-tincentives: The Effect of
Canine Sniff Jurisprudence on the Demand for and Development of Search Technology, 72
Brook. L. Rev. 279, 284–88 (2006) (discussing “law enforcement agencies’ market
demand for technologies—such as thermal imaging devices, x-ray scanners, stationary
radar detectors, and drug sniffing canines—that enhance police officers’ abilities to
detect unlawful activity, make arrests, or issue citations” (footnotes omitted)).
120
See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, Nat’l Inst. of Standards & Tech.,
The Report of the Expert Working Group on Human Factors in Latent Print
Analysis, Latent Print Examination and Human Factors: Improving the Practice Through a Systems Approach (2012), available at http://www.nist.gov/
customcf/get_pdf.cfm?pub_id=910745 (studying errors in fingerprint analysis); Andrew E. Taslitz, Does the Cold Nose Know? The Unscientific Myth of the Dog Scent Lineup, 42
Hastings L.J. 15, 20–25, 52–59 (1990) (discussing problems with dog scent lineups,
where a dog smells evidence at a crime scene and is then used to detect an identical
smell on a suspect); Natalie Ram, The Mismatch Between Probable Cause and Partial
Matching, 118 Yale L.J. Pocket Part 182, 185 (2009), http://thepocketpart.org/2009/
04/13/ram.html (describing how “partial [DNA] matching methods presently have a
substantial rate of false positives—supposed relatives who, upon analysis, turn out not
to be related”). Justice Souter largely based his dissent in Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S.
405 (2005), which held that dogs may sniff vehicles during routine traffic stops, on
the fact that “[t]he infallible dog . . . is a creature of legal fiction.” Id. at 411.
121
U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, supra note 120, at 32 (discussing research that
shows that error rates in fingerprint matching “may not be trivial” (quoting Simon A.
Cole, More Than Zero: Accounting for Error in Latent Fingerprint Identification, 95 J. Crim.
L. & Tech. 985, 1034 (2005))).
122
The New York City Police Department has invested in facial recognition
technology that would, according to one court, “use thousands of government and
private cameras to capture vehicle license plates, suspicious behavior and the faces of
pedestrians using facial recognition technology, all of which would be fed into a central database maintained at an NYPD command center where the information would
be immediately analyzed to determine whether any security threat was imminent or
whether there was any suspicious pattern in the movement of persons and vehicles.”
N.Y. Civil Liberties Union v. N.Y.C. Police Dep’t, N.Y. L.J., July 6, 2009, at 18 (N.Y.
June 26, 2009).
123
Familial DNA matching occurs when a DNA sample from a crime scene
partially matches the DNA stored in a DNA databank. This type of partial match does
not implicate the person whose DNA is stored, but relatives of that person. See Ram,
supra note 120, at 183.
124
See Simmons, supra note 14, at 453 (describing hypothetical software that
sifts through millions of emails and files to uncover child pornography, boasting a
low false positive rate, but a similarly low accuracy rate).
125
Fingerprint analysis, presumed highly reliable by courts, is subject to a
variety of human errors. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, supra note 120, at 23 (discussing
human-factor errors “that are specific to an individual examiner, those that are fea-
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alerts by drug sniffing dogs due to handlers misreading the dog’s signals
126
or influencing the dog’s behavior.
Despite the potential for false positives, courts have held that positive
results from some of these techniques, including drug sniffing dogs, can
127
satisfy probable cause without any other basis for suspicion. Other
scholars believe that positive results from certain techniques should
128
never be enough on their own to satisfy probable cause. Rather than
presume that certain types of investigative devices are always reliable
enough or never reliable enough to satisfy probable cause, courts should
hold that alerts from these devices may or may not be sufficient to yield
probable cause. Consideration of the error rates of certain investigative
tools should be deemed necessary to determine whether positive alerts by
such tools are reliable enough to satisfy probable cause to conduct a full
129
search.
Other investigative techniques, usually those relying on a police
officer’s skill or experience, would not benefit as much from a rigorous
quantification of error rates. Separating these two types of techniques is
critical because data collection requires resources, and because an overly
technical assessment of probable cause may distort the role that police
130
expertise and intuition plays in the inquiry. It is also critical that error
rates are measured in ways that can be most easily translated into the

tures or products of the work environment, and those that are the result of failures of
supervision and the structure of the organization”). Drug sniffing dogs also have
highly variable error rates. As Justice Souter noted in Caballes, “a study cited by Illinois
in this case for the proposition that dog sniffs are ‘generally reliable’ shows that dogs
in artificial testing situations return false positives anywhere from 12.5% to 60% of
the time, depending on the length of the search.” Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 412 (2005)
(Souter, J., dissenting) (citing Kelly J. Garner et al., Duty Cycle of the Detector Dog: A
Baseline Study 12 (Apr. 2001) (prepared by Auburn Univ. Inst. for Biological Detection Sys., funded by the Fed. Aviation Admin.)); see also Bird, supra note 109, at 411
n.41.
126
E.g., Katz & Golembiewski, supra note 114, at 762 (explaining that the
handlers of drug detection dogs can “cause an error by influencing a dog’s sniff or
misconstruing a dog’s reaction”); Lisa Lit et al., Handler Beliefs Affect Scent Detection Dog
Outcomes, Animal Cognition (Jan. 12, 2011), http://www.npca.net/Files/SWGDOG/
LIT%20Study.pdf (demonstrating that a dog is more likely to positively alert to drugs
where handlers believe drugs are located). A lawsuit was recently filed alleging that
the Nevada Highway Patrol was training its dogs to respond to cues instead of the
smell of drugs. See Nicole Lucht, NHP Troopers Sue Department Over K-9 Program, 8
News NOW (June 26, 2012), http://www.8newsnow.com/story/18886948/
nhp-troopers-sue-department-over-k-9-program.
127
See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
128
One scholar has argued that a positive alert by a drug sniffing dog, on its
own, should never satisfy probable cause. See infra note 164 and accompanying text.
129
Some of these techniques are intrusive enough to already be considered
searches, requiring probable cause or reasonable suspicion before they can be used.
Binary searches may even trigger Fourth Amendment protections if they intrude upon privacy interests. See Simmons, supra note 14, at 459–62.
130
See infra Part IV for arguments against quantifying probable cause generally.
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probable cause inquiry, and that judges are aware of the limitations of
quantification.
A. Requiring Error Rates
Rather than presume that positive results from mechanized or
nonhuman investigative techniques are always (or never) sufficient to
satisfy probable cause, quantified error rates should be included in the
probable cause inquiry. This section proposes some guidelines for courts
to determine when to require quantified error rates and when a rigorous
assessment of error rates is unnecessary.
1. Cases Where Quantified Error Rates Are Not Necessary
As one scholar has remarked, “[a]ll proof is ultimately ‘probabilistic’
in the sense that no conclusion can ever be drawn from empirical data
without some step of inductive inference. The question is whether to
bring this probabilistic element of inference to explicit attention in a
131
quantified way, i.e., in overtly probabilistic evidence.” Some of the
evidence relevant to probable cause can best be assessed without overtly
probabilistic attention, using testimony that need not be reduced to
numbers. For example, a police officer’s testimony that a driver had a
large air freshener hanging from his rearview mirror satisfied probable
cause to stop the car for violating a statute prohibiting mirror
132
obstructions. Probable cause was also satisfied when a police officer
searched a duffel bag belonging to a man arrested for burglary after the
133
police officer recognized the bag from the bank robbery.
Statistical evidence could have been used in these cases, as in every
case, to assess the reliability of a police officer’s suspicion. Courts could
require data on how often a police officer actually recovers evidence
from her searches or, in the case of arrests, how often a targeted
individual has actually committed the crime suspected by police.
However, in situations where the police can testify to their direct
observations, statistical evidence is not necessary to assess reliability. In
these cases, statistical evidence measures only how effectively and how
scrupulously officers are performing their jobs, and police officers can
testify directly.
For example, the collection of data on a particular informant’s
accuracy rate (or “track record”) in leading the police to criminal activity
can assist the courts in determining if a particular informant is likely to
be lying or misinformed in a particular case. However, discerning the
accuracy of an informant is something law enforcement learns to do over
time when dealing with informants. In some situations, a police officer
may have reason to believe that an informant who has been unreliable in

131
132
133

Bacigal, supra note 20, at 295.
United States v. Garcia-Garcia, 633 F.3d 608, 612–16 (7th Cir. 2011).
United States v. Potts, 459 F. App’x 455, 456 (5th Cir. 2012).
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the past is now highly credible. A police officer’s expert intuition might
actually be more accurate in that case than any past statistical evidence of
134
the informant’s track record. In the case of informants, police can
perform the same task as statistical evidence in determining reliability,
and in fact can sometimes perform the task better. Thus, while data on
an informant’s track record is relevant to probable cause, it should not
135
be required.
As another example, one scholar has proposed that success rates in
recovering evidence be reported for individual police officers (not just for
136
their informants) as part of the probable cause determination. This data
would be helpful in ferreting out officers who lie to obtain warrants or who
137
frequently misjudge informants, but should not be deemed necessary to
the probable cause analysis. If officers seeking to establish probable cause
had to present evidence of their own track records, this might over-deter
them from following their instincts in close cases for fear of being accused
of malfeasance. Moreover, in cases where police are making judgment calls
in unique or fast-developing situations, the factors influencing probable
138
cause are less susceptible to statistical quantification.
2. Cases Where Quantified Error Rates Are Necessary
In contrast, where a police officer uses a device or investigative
technique to perform a task that she cannot perform based on her
observation, intuition, or judgment, statistical evidence would not
measure how well the police are performing their jobs or whether they
are lying to magistrate judges, but would evaluate the accuracy of a device
that has essentially replaced the police officer. In addition, because the
tools being measured largely do not rely on a police officer’s expertise in
appraising criminal behavior, and operate somewhat independently of
the police officer, the officer cannot accurately assess that tool’s
reliability based on observation or skill. Error rates should be required,
for instance, where the police use drug sniffing dogs outside vehicles at
routine traffic stops because the police cannot tell from direct
139
observation in that one instance the accuracy of a particular dog.
134

For more on how courts have used informants’ track records, see supra

Part II.C.
135

The Supreme Court’s determination that the reliability of a drug sniffing dog can be assessed in the same way as a confidential informant thus ignores the
ability of humans to judge each other’s credibility in a way that cannot be accomplished when assessing a dog’s reliability. See Florida v. Harris, 133 S. Ct. 1050, 1056
(2013).
136
Minzner, supra note 78, at 920–21.
137
See id. at 922; see generally Melanie D. Wilson, An Exclusionary Rule for Police Lies, 47 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1 (2010).
138
See Watson v. Kansas City, 857 F.2d 690, 695 (10th Cir. 1988) (“Whether
or not probable cause exists is not susceptible to statistical quantification. It
represents a judgment call on the part of the officer or officers at the scene taking
into account the particular circumstances.”).
139
The Florida Supreme Court came to a similar conclusion. See supra Part
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Consider a case in which a witness tells a police officer that someone
discarded a gun behind a dumpster after being involved in a murder.
Police recover the gun, and a fingerprint analyst finds that a print left on
the gun matches a suspect. The testimony of the police officer and
witness (with cross-examination if a court is later reviewing probable
cause at a criminal trial) speaks directly to whether the suspect touched
the gun. No statistics are needed to establish the police officer’s
reliability. Statistical evidence on the print examiner’s accuracy rate,
however, is needed to assess whether his determination that the prints
matched was reliable. The police cannot assess this themselves. The same
would be true for DNA matches and positive alerts by drug sniffing dogs
or facial recognition technology.
A more difficult case involves a police officer’s testimony that a
suspect was located in a “high-crime area.” As mentioned above, presence
in a high-crime area cannot establish probable cause or reasonable
140
suspicion on its own, but may be relevant to the inquiry. Suspicion
based on presence in a “high-crime area” exists on the border between
evidence whose reliability can be established with direct testimony and
evidence that requires statistical verification. Unlike the case of an
informant, where a police officer can provide testimony on why he
trusted a particular informant in a particular situation, it is far more
difficult for courts to assess whether, in general, an area has certain crime
characteristics. Courts might consider, as some scholars have proposed,
requiring statistical evidence to demonstrate that a particular location is a
141
However, because police officers learn from
high-crime area.
experience which neighborhoods have particular profiles for criminality,
police officers’ testimony about a neighborhood being a high-crime area
is more well-informed and instinctively based than testimony that a
particular investigative device is accurate. Because evidence that an area
is high in criminal activity cannot on its own satisfy probable cause, courts
could simply decide that rigorous statistical evidence is less important in
this context.
B. Calculating Error Rates
Once a court determines that a particular investigative technique
requires statistical evidence to assess its reliability, the statistics must be
properly calculated. False positive rates, which measure how often a
device positively alerts given an innocent situation, can assess a device’s

II.C. Most courts, however, presume that a drug sniffing dog’s positive alert is reliable
if that dog has been trained and certified, and some even refuse to hear challenges to
a dog’s training. See, e.g., Amicus Brief of the Commonwealth of Virginia et al. in
Support of Petitioner at 4, Florida v. Harris, 133 S. Ct. 1050 (2013) (No. 11-817) (citing cases that support the proposition).
140
See supra Part II.D.
141
See Ferguson & Bernache, supra note 94, at 1593.
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142

consistent, unchanging reliability. However, false positive rates are not
directly translatable into the probable cause inquiry because they do not
account for how often a device actually detects true criminal activity. This
number will vary based on the population that is targeted by an
investigative device. The question most appropriate to the probable cause
inquiry is: What percentage of positive alerts by a particular investigative
device, either alone or when combined with other evidence, actually lead
to the discovery of criminal behavior?
As explained in this subsection, in order to best assist a judge in
making a probable cause determination, statistical evidence must
account for both a device’s accuracy and the odds of criminality prior to
using the device. These prior odds of criminality represent both the
frequency of criminal activity among those targeted for the device’s use
143
(often referred to as a “base rate”) and any extra suspicion a particular
suspect has elicited prior to use of the device. A positive alert and a
144
these prior odds of
device’s false positive rate then “updates”
criminality. The prior odds and the consistent device accuracy combine
to answer the probable cause question—or, the odds that criminal
behavior is occurring.
1. False Positive Rates
To ensure that a device is accurate enough to be probative of the
probable cause inquiry, courts first need to know how an investigative
tool’s positive alert affects the prior probability that a suspect is behaving
145
criminally. A device with a high false positive rate provides information
that is not particularly probative in affecting the probable cause inquiry,
and does not greatly influence the prior likelihood of criminality. If a
device is infallible, then every time it indicates criminal activity, courts
can be sure there is a 100% chance that criminal activity is occurring. In
measuring the accuracy of a fallible device, courts should be concerned
146
with “false positives,” or incorrect indications of criminal behavior.

142

Simmons, supra note 14, at 452–53.
Jonathan J. Koehler & Daniel N. Shaviro, Veridical Verdicts: Increasing Verdict Accuracy Through the Use of Overtly Probabilistic Evidence and Methods, 75 Cornell L.
Rev. 247, 247 n.2 (1990) (“Base rates describe the frequency with which a relevant
attribute occurs among members of a reference population. A base rate may also be
thought of as the probability that a randomly selected member of a reference population will have the relevant attribute.”).
144
For a thorough discussion of how prior odds of criminal behavior can be
updated with new information using a formula called Bayes’ Theorem, see generally id.
at 255–56.
145
The probative value of a piece of evidence is defined by the degree to
which it “tends to prove or disprove a point an issue.” Black’s Law Dictionary 639
(9th ed. 2009) (definition of “probative evidence”); see also id. at 1323 (“probative”
defined as “[t]ending to prove or disprove”).
146
In the surveillance context, for example, false positives are defined as
“interceptions that prove upon investigation to have no intelligence value.” Richard
A. Posner, Privacy, Surveillance, and Law, 75 U. Chi. L. Rev. 245, 252 (2008). False pos143

2013]

GETTING BEYOND INTUITION

817

False positives are particularly troubling in the context of the Fourth
147
Amendment, as they lead to intrusive searches of innocent individuals.
False positive rates can be measured by testing a device in simulated
situations where the device should not positively alert. For example, if
facial recognition technology is exposed to 100 faces that do not actually
match a suspect’s face, and the technology indicates a match for 50 of
those faces, the technology has a 50% false positive rate. If Bandit the
cocaine-sniffing dog, in a training test, is exposed to 1000 cars that do not
contain cocaine, and Bandit alerts to the presence of drugs in two of
those cars, Bandit has a fairly low false positive rate of 0.2%. Bandit’s
accuracy means that his positive alert is highly probative in determining
the likelihood that a car contains cocaine, if he also has a good
specificity, meaning if he has a high “true positive” percentage of alerting
when there are actually drugs in the car.
The probative value of a device in demonstrating probable cause can
be measured using the ratio of the true positive to the false positive rate,
148
or what some scholars have termed a “likelihood ratio.” The likelihood
ratio measures the ratio of how often an alert would occur given that
there are drugs in the car to how often an alert would occur given that
149
there are no drugs in the car. A dog that always alerts when there are
drugs in the car, but has a 50% false positive rate has a likelihood ratio of
two, or 1/0.5. A likelihood ratio of two means that the odds of drugs
being in a particular location are twice as likely, given an alert, than if
there is no alert.
False positive rates do not give a complete picture of probable cause,
however. Even if a device has a very low rate of false positives, this does
not always translate to a high likelihood of criminal activity, the essence
150
of the probable cause inquiry. In other words, Bandit’s 0.2% false
positive rate does not necessarily mean that there is now a 99.8% chance
that a car that Bandit alerts to contains cocaine. If there is a low
incidence of cocaine in vehicles targeted by Bandit, say one out of every
10,000 vehicles, Bandit’s 0.2% false positive rate will not translate to a
high likelihood of drugs in a vehicle given a positive alert. For every
10,000 vehicles, Bandit will falsely alert to the presence of cocaine 20
times (10,000 x .002), and he will correctly alert to the presence of drugs
itives are called a Type I error in statistics. See Alexander A. Reinert, Public Interest(s)
and Fourth Amendment Enforcement, 2010 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1461, 1492–93 and n.179
(2010).
147
See Myers, supra note 19, at 12–13.
148
D. H. Kaye & Jonathan J. Koehler, The Misquantification of Probative Value,
27 Law & Hum. Behav. 645, 648 (2003).
149
See David H. Kaye, The Double Helix and the Law of Evidence 20–
22 (2010).
150
See Myers, supra note 19, at 12–16; see also Simmons, supra note 14, at 452
(explaining that although a false positive rate is constant, the actual likelihood of
criminality “will vary widely depending on the actual frequency of the illegal activity
that is being investigated”).
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once, assuming he always alerts when drugs are present. Thus, given a
positive alert by Bandit, there will be only a 1/21 chance, or about a 5%
chance, that a particular vehicle alerted to by Bandit will contain drugs.
This should not satisfy probable cause—a 5% likelihood of criminal
activity can hardly be said to warrant a person of “‘reasonable caution in
151
the belief that’ an offense has been or is being committed.” In short,
Bandit’s false positive rate means that his positive alert is very probative in
a probable cause inquiry, and it highly alters the prior probability of
criminality of 1/10,000. However, the low percentage of drugs in the
population targeted by Bandit means that his positive alert likely does not
152
cross the probable cause hurdle.
This example illustrates why statistical evidence that accounts solely
for false positive rates does not actually measure the odds of criminal
153
behavior. Professor Richard Myers has explained, in the context of
drug sniffing dogs and probability theory, why the odds that a dog will
alert when there are no drugs in a vehicle (the false positive rate) is not
the same as the odds that there are no drugs in a vehicle given that a dog
has alerted (the information needed to answer the probable cause
154
question). Using an equation called Bayes’ Theorem, Myers explains
that what is missing from the false positive rate to convert it into the odds
155
of criminal behavior is the prior probability of criminal activity. This
prior probability can reflect either the degree to which an officer already
156
suspects an individual, or the frequency of the criminal behavior within
157
a population targeted by a device. As with the Bandit example, the false
positive rate of a device is said to update the original odds of criminality
with new odds for a particular suspect who has been identified as
158
engaging in criminal behavior by the device.
Because base rates are so variable, the Supreme Court in Florida v.
Harris was unduly hasty in concluding that “evidence of a dog’s
satisfactory performance in a certification or training program can itself
159
provide sufficient reason to trust his alert.” These programs use
simulated testing that does not account for the variability of base rates of
151

Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175–76 (1949) (quoting Carroll
v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925)).
152
See Myers, supra note 19, at 14 (“If the probability [of criminal activity]
was low to begin with, even a really good test will still result in a relatively low [likelihood of that criminal activity].”). Although we do not know what the probable cause
hurdle is, it is likely greater than 5% suspicion.
153
See id. at 12–16. For another example of why false positives cannot answer that probable cause question, using software that searches for child pornography, see Simmons, supra note 14, at 453.
154
Myers, supra note 19, at 12–16.
155
Id.
156
Id.
157
See Simmons, supra note 14, at 451–53.
158
See Myers, supra note 19, at 12–16.
159
Florida v. Harris, 133 S. Ct. 1050, 1057 (2013).
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drugs within the population. As explained in the next subsection, the
160
Court’s elevation of “a dog’s real false positives” over field accuracy
rates misunderstands the statistics involved, and places the probative
value of false positives over the actual probable cause inquiry: the
likelihood that drugs will actually be present in a particular car given a
positive alert.
2. Accuracy Rates
To properly measure the actual likelihood of criminal behavior
based on a positive alert by an investigative tool, statistical evidence must
therefore account for both the tool’s accuracy (the false positive rate and
the true positive rate) and either the frequency of criminality of those
targeted for a device’s use, or some measure of a police officer’s
161
suspicion prior to the positive alert (the prior odds of criminality). The
frequency of criminal behavior in a population is difficult to measure,
and it is basically impossible to quantify many of the intangible factors
162
tending towards suspicion. Because even a low false positive rate is not
a good indicator of likelihood of criminal activity, especially with largely
innocent populations or where the police have no other reason to
163
suspect someone of wrongdoing, Professor Myers argues that a positive
alert by a drug sniffing dog should never be sufficient on its own, without
164
knowing the prior odds of criminality, to satisfy probable cause.
However, there is a way to collect data that accounts for both a tool’s
accuracy and the prior odds of criminality within the population targeted
for use by a device. Police officers could record statistics in the field
instead of measuring false positives in simulations. Field statistics
measure how often a device’s positive alert leads to finding criminal
activity, the key number for the probable cause analysis. Many courts
165
already use field statistics in the context of drug sniffing dogs, although
law enforcement does not always appear to be calculating them
166
correctly. To translate most directly into the probable cause inquiry,
160

Id.
In the area of drug detection dogs, according to one scholar, “[p]olice
usually use drug detection canines only after a suspect or item is sufficiently suspicious to warrant the use of a dog. Therefore, the relevant ‘population’ is not the general populace, but a narrowed group that police have determined through their
training and experience are more likely to possess narcotics than the general public.”
Bird, supra note 109, at 429 (footnote omitted).
162
For example, how does one quantify the added suspicion gained when a
suspect appears nervous, especially given that whether or not a suspect appears nervous is a vague and fairly subjective assessment?
163
See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
164
Myers, supra note 19.
165
See, e.g., United States v. Scott, 610 F.3d 1009, 1014 (8th Cir. 2010) (“Officer Berg testified that Naton’s accuracy rating is 98 or 99 percent in training and 85
percent in the field.”). For more examples, see supra note 112.
166
See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 448 F. App’x 936, 939 (11th Cir. 2011)
(“Moreover, even considering [the dog] Dusty’s alleged 70% accuracy rate in the
161
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courts must assess the number of times drugs were found in the car out
of the times that the dog had positively alerted, not given all the times a
dog had been used.
As an example, if Lucy the drug sniffing dog positively alerts to the
presence of drugs in 100 cars targeted for drug sniffs in New York City,
and 90 of those cars actually contain drugs, Lucy has a 90% field accuracy
rate. If those field statistics can be extrapolated generally, which is a
167
difficult question that will be discussed in the next subsection, courts
can then conclude that if Lucy alerts to the presence of drugs in a
vehicle, there is a 90% chance that drugs will be found in that vehicle.
This answers the probable cause question, as a 90% likelihood of
criminality will certainly satisfy probable cause. While 10 out of 100 car
searches guided by an alert will likely not contain drugs, probable cause
does not require that no innocents are searched. In contrast with a 50%
false positive rate, if Lucy positively alerts to the presence of drugs 100
times, and 50 of those cars actually contain drugs, we might then also be
able to say that there is a 50% chance that drugs are actually in the
vehicle if Lucy alerts. Depending on the actual probable cause hurdle,
probable cause may or may not be satisfied in that case.
For many cases, field statistics can directly translate into the probable
cause inquiry. Field statistics reflect the degree of suspicion associated
with a suspect’s behavior and the likelihood of criminality prior to using
a device because, if officers target only those who are more likely to be
168
behaving criminally, field accuracy rates will increase dramatically. Of
course, police officers will then be using their intuitive judgment to
determine which suspects to target, but that intuition is then entirely
field, a positive alert would be sufficient to establish a ‘fair probability’ that drugs
would be found in the car.”). At the district court level, Dusty’s accuracy rate should
have been 56% but was calculated as 30% because the court did not simply account
for the times that drugs were found in the vehicle given a positive alert, but also added the times that Dusty did not alert at all. See United States v. Smith, No. 2:09-cr-59FtM-29SPC, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123516, *13–14 (M.D. Fla. 2009). According to the
district court, “[The investigator] also testified to reviewing the records of the K-9
used in this case specifically for the years 2008 and 2009. During that time period,
Dusty, the K-9, was used to potentially detect narcotics a total of 89 times. Thirty-two
(32) of those times there was no alert and 57 times Dusty actually alerted. No narcotics or narcotics paraphernalia were found as a result of 25 of those alerts. . . . In calculating the percentages, [the investigator] testified that almost 30 percent of the time
Dusty alerted, there were no drugs present.” Id. (citations and footnotes omitted).
167
Extrapolation of field data to formulate a general likelihood is difficult
because the base rate of criminality varies, so questions will arise as to how specifically
statistics need to be collected and broken down with respect to different locations,
types of suspects, etc. For example, do field statistics need to account for use of the
device among middle-aged men in Central Park, or can youths in the Upper West
Side generally be aggregated with that data? What about all people in Manhattan?
This question will be confronted infra Part III.C.
168
Thus, requiring officers to collect field statistics may render the officers
less willing to use particular devices on subjects in a largely innocent population
without any prior suspicion.
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reflected in an increase or decrease in the device’s accuracy. The device
thus both reflects and replaces the officer’s intuition. In the Lucy
example, any prior suspicion a police officer has before using Lucy is
essentially transferred into her nose in altering her accuracy rate.
Moreover, once the device has essentially replaced the police officer’s
intuition, only statistical evidence can attest to the device’s accuracy rate.
Ultimately, it is the positive alert by the device, and not the police officer,
that makes a prediction relevant to probable cause.
Field statistics even account for human error in using a device, as
decreased accuracy rates in the field will result if law enforcement is
using a device incorrectly. In the case of drug sniffing dogs, a dog’s
handler may unconsciously cue the dog to alert when the handler thinks
169
a vehicle is likely to contain drugs. This interaction between dog and
handler will be incorporated into the field accuracy rates. If an officer is
incorrect most of the time, the accuracy rate will decrease. If the
interaction between dog and handler makes it more likely that a positive
alert will lead to the discovery of drugs, this will also be reflected in the
accuracy rate.
Field statistics thus incorporate the prior odds of criminal
wrongdoing and the accuracy of an investigative tool, which translate to
the probability of criminal activity. Taking field statistics has some costs,
however, and it may be difficult to discern which field statistics can be
extrapolated so as to be relevant to a particular probable cause inquiry.
These issues will be addressed in the next subsection.
C. Problems with Quantifying Error Rates
An obvious difficulty in mandating that quantified error rates be
included as part of the probable cause inquiry is the time and cost of
collecting this data. Although federal, state, and local legislatures
170
routinely require that law enforcement collect certain statistics, the
collection of data on accuracy rates relevant to the probable cause
inquiry would, necessarily, be an unfunded mandate—courts can require
the collection of such statistics, but cannot allocate money to fund the
effort. However, many law enforcement groups already collect statistics
testing the accuracy of particular investigative devices in order to more
171
effectively perform their jobs. In many ways, the collection of this data
would redound to the benefit of the law enforcement community:
skeptical judges can be satisfied when devices are accurate, and law
169

See Myers, supra note 19, at 34.
See, e.g., Jordan Blair Woods, Comment, Addressing Youth Bias Crime, 56
UCLA L. Rev. 1899, 1902 (2009) (“Bias crime statistics legislation allocates resources
to facilitate the collection of data on bias crimes.”).
171
See, e.g., Myers, supra note 19, at 33 (explaining that the United States
Army mandates the collection of drug sniffing dogs’ field accuracy rates and proposing that, “[a]t the very least, the courts should mandate the collection of data on the
use of the dogs and their accuracy rates in the field”).
170
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enforcement can have more faith in its investigations. Requiring
statistical evidence on a device’s accuracy rate may deter police officers
from using devices in random, haphazard ways, which would otherwise
172
result in more false alerts in largely innocent populations.
173
Of course, asking law enforcement, or forensic scientists, to collect
statistical evidence on the accuracy of its investigative tools could be
likened to letting the fox guard the henhouse. Random checks and
supervisory oversight can prevent police officers from improperly
reporting statistics, but unscrupulous police officers may fail to report
searches that do not result in uncovering evidence of illegal activity. That
said, police officers are asked to collect statistics in areas that impugn
their integrity far more than recording the accuracy of their investigative
174
devices.
Even if police scrupulously record statistics, whether a device has
actually produced a false alert may be a complicated question. For
example, law enforcement officers may argue that if a drug sniffing dog
gives a positive alert, but no drugs are found, then the area recently
175
contained drugs that were removed prior to the search. For the
purposes of the probable cause inquiry, the best approach would be to
assume an inaccurate alert in all cases where illegal activity is not
ultimately found. Because there is usually no way to tell whether drugs
have been removed or if they were never there in the first place,
assuming that the dog has alerted falsely best measures the percentage of
cases in which a positive alert actually leads to the detection of criminal
behavior, the essence of the probable cause inquiry. The point of
collecting accuracy rates is ultimately not to test the quality of the dog,
but the meaning of an alert by the dog—an alert that means “there used
176
to be cocaine here” is not enough for a search.

172

See Bird, supra note 109, at 430–33.
The study and collection of data on accuracy rates for finger print examiners is explored thoroughly in The Report of the Expert Working Group on Human Factors
in Latent Print Analysis. See generally U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, supra note 120.
174
For example, the United States Department of Justice (USDOJ) has entered into agreements with several law enforcement agencies requiring “the collection and analysis of demographic data on police stops. USDOJ typically monitors
agencies operating under these agreements for continuing statistical evidence of bias.” Michael R. Smith, Depoliticizing Racial Profiling: Suggestions for the Limited Use and
Management of Race in Police Decision-Making, 15 Geo. Mason U. C.R. L.J. 219, 221
(2005).
175
See 1 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the
Fourth Amendment § 2.2(f) n.239, at 450 (3d ed. 1996) (“It has been estimated that
most of the cash in circulation (the estimates range from 70% to 97% of all bills)
contains sufficient quantities of cocaine to alert a trained dog. Thus it sometimes
happens in practice that a drug dog alert will lead to nothing but currency.” (citation
omitted)).
176
For this reason, the Supreme Court was incorrect to conclude, in Florida
v. Harris, that because of residual odors, a positive alert that leads to no discovery of
evidence does not undermine a dog’s reliability in the probable cause inquiry. 133 S.
173
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Problems will also arise in deciding which field accuracy data should
be considered in the probable cause determination. Courts must
consider whether all field data collected with respect to a particular dog
is relevant, or only field data that is specific to a dog/law enforcement
handler pair. Field sobriety tests, as another example, show a wide
177
variance in accuracy depending on the officer administering the test.
Thus, data should be recorded for each officer individually.
Because both the baseline frequency of criminal behavior in a
population and odds with respect to a particular suspect based on her
behavior contribute to field accuracy rates, courts must decide whether
data from different areas in the same city can be combined, and whether
data from the use on someone who behaved suspiciously can be
178
combined with data for a suspicionless use of the device. If the police
always use a device when there is some reason to suspect an individual of
criminal behavior, this will compensate for any differences in the
frequency of criminality in different locations and produce a consistent
accuracy rate. In that instance, data from different locations in the same
city can be combined and extrapolated into the probable cause inquiry.
Questions regarding the basis for accuracy rates may mire courts in
battles over whether the statistical evidence offered can be directly
translated into the probable cause inquiry. However, this has not been
overly problematic for the jurisdictions that already include statistical
179
evidence in the probable cause inquiry. Currently, as mentioned above,
courts already use field accuracy statistics and extrapolate to the probable
cause inquiry in the areas of informants’ track records, efficacy of
checkpoints, and high-crime areas; they are just not doing so in a
180
particularly informed or systematized way.
The concern over which evidence is relevant to the probable cause
inquiry can be resolved by simply giving more specific evidence more
weight. Professor Max Minzner proposed a similar solution in the context
of arguing that police should be required to present their accuracy rates
181
as part of the probable cause inquiry. According to Minzner, the way in
which the evidence was gathered, and how specific it is, should influence
182
how much weight the evidence merits in the probable cause inquiry.
Ct. 1050, 1056–57 & n.2 (2013). Probable cause considers the likelihood that evidence will actually be found, not the likelihood that a suspect actually committed the
crime involved. An alert that does not lead to the detection of evidence should therefore be considered a false alert, even if the dog is correctly responding to the former
presence of drugs.
177
See, e.g., United States v. Horn, 185 F. Supp. 2d 530, 539–40 (D. Md. 2002).
178
This might be problematic because individuals whom the police have
reason to suspect of wrongdoing may have higher prior odds of criminality, affecting
the Bayesian updating of a device’s accuracy.
179
See supra note 112.
180
Supra Parts II.D and III.B.
181
See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
182
Minzner, supra note 78, at 955. How courts can incorporate quantifiable
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For example, if evidence is collected pertaining to the field accuracy rate
of a particular drug sniffing dog/handler pair in a specific area in
Philadelphia, and the dog is generally used only when police suspect an
individual for other reasons insufficient to satisfy probable cause on their
own, that data is highly relevant to the likelihood that an individual in
that neighborhood, when targeted based on the usual level of suspicion
by that particular dog/handler pair, is carrying drugs.
In other words, statistical evidence collected in a very specific way
applies to a particular instance that matches the other nearly identical
field data. In contrast, evidence that is supported only by a
heterogeneous sample carries less weight and may not be directly
extrapolated into the probable cause likelihood, but can still be
considered. If an accuracy rate is not measured specifically enough, for
example, a court could hold that the prosecution has not met its burden
of proof to satisfy probable cause. Or, a court could conclude that, in
showing that a particular dog has a 70% accuracy rate with less specific
statistical evidence, that the evidence is sufficient to meet the 50%
hurdle.
Those who argue against overly quantified legal standards also
present the “capacity objection,” which asserts that courts, not generally
experts in mathematics, are not well equipped to assess statistical
183
evidence. The capacity objection provides another reason why courts
should require statistical evidence only when there is no other valid way
to assess whether a positive alert by that device gave rise to probable
cause. However, this objection has much more salience when juries, not
184
judges, are examining probabilistic evidence. According to Minzner,
“magistrate judges . . . are repeat players in the search process. If
statistical learning is possible, the search process presents the ideal test
case. Furthermore, there is little evidence that judges are better at
185
making a probability calculation from nonstatistical evidence.”
Judges, repeat players, can be instructed as to the pitfalls of weighing
explicitly probabilistic evidence. The evolution of the increasingly
nuanced and scientifically accurate role of DNA evidence in criminal

evidence into the probable cause inquiry will be discussed infra Part IV.
183
One scholar has explained that “capacity-based objections are claims
that legal decision makers simply cannot make good decisions based on statistical data because they are not trained in drawing inferences from empirical data and, in any
event, good, relevant data is generally unavailable.” Minzner, supra note 78, at 951.
For further discussion of this objection, see infra Part IV.
184
See Colin Miller, Diamond Dogs, Take 2: Etan Patz, Florida v. Harris & Quantifying Probable Cause, EvidenceProf Blog (Apr. 22, 2012), http://
lawprofessors.typepad.com/evidenceprof/2012/04/cadaver-dogs-are-back-in-the-newswith-the-relevation-that-a-cadaver-sniffing-dogdetected-the-odor-of-human-remains-ina-base.html (discussing the differences between judges’ and juries’ weighing of probabilistic evidence).
185
Minzner, supra note 78, at 954–55; see supra Part III.B.
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186

trials demonstrates how this learning occurs. Although Daubert-type
hearings, which ensure that scientific evidence satisfies the requirements
for expert testimony at trial, would not be necessary at the probable
187
cause stage, the role of judge as gatekeeper to admit only scientifically
valid testimony at trial should allay fears about a judge’s ability to
conduct a flexible inquiry that examines error rates and is probabilistic in
188
nature.
In some cases, courts may decide they must use false positive data
instead of field accuracy rates. Using data on false positives is an attractive
option because false positive rates are more easily measured and do not
change based on the frequency of criminality within a population. New
devices or recently developed techniques may require consideration of
false positives, as there will be insufficient field statistics to measure
accuracy. Alternatively, courts could use statistics from other devices; they
could presume, for instance, that a well-trained dog that received a
similar type of training is generally a certain percentage accurate until
the dog has a large enough number of alerts.
False positive data, generated by simulations, would also have to
substitute for field data in cases where police cannot ultimately verify
whether a suspect was behaving criminally. This occurs in cases of
fingerprint or DNA analysis, where a forensic scientist may find a match,
but there is no way to ultimately know if the suspect is guilty. Testing can
still be performed on individual fingerprint examiners using artificial
189
experiments to measure an examiner’s false positive rate. However, as
mentioned above, false positive data does not speak directly to the
190
probable cause inquiry.
In cases where statistics truly cannot be collected because of extreme
hardship, cost, or complexity of data collection, courts could mandate
191
standardized training in using a device. One of the reasons that the
186

See generally Kaye, supra note 149.
As one federal circuit court remarked with respect to dog sniffs, “the
dog’s alert . . . would serve not as actual evidence of drugs, but simply to establish
probable cause to obtain a warrant to search for such substantive evidence.” United
States v. Allen, 159 F.3d 832, 840 (4th Cir. 1998).
188
The Supreme Court in Daubert listed several factors for judges to consider before admitting expert testimony under Federal Rule of Evidence 702. The Court
instructed judges that, “in the case of a particular scientific technique, the court ordinarily should consider the known or potential rate of error, and the existence and
maintenance of standards controlling the technique’s operation.” Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 594 (1993) (citations omitted).
189
See U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, supra note 120, at 33–38.
190
See infra Part IV for incorporation of different types of error rates into
the probable cause inquiry.
191
Richard Myers has proposed this with respect to drug sniffing dogs. See
Myers, supra note 19, at 34 (“If we are really interested in protecting the public’s
Fourth Amendment interests, we need to set state and federal standards for training
dogs, rather than leaving them to the private sector. The process of drafting standards will move that debate out of the courts, where they are enforced by the exclu187
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Florida Supreme Court required field evidence of drug sniffing dogs’
accuracy as part of the probable cause inquiry was because “[i]n the
absence of a uniform standard [of training of drug sniffing dogs], the
reliability of the dog cannot be established by demonstrating only that a
192
canine is trained and certified.” Standardized training and uniform
193
protocols have also been suggested for fingerprint examiners.
Civil liberties are compromised when law enforcement uses fallible
devices that sanction intrusive searches with no indication of their
reliability. Ultimately, it is better to quantify accuracy rates than simply
presume that a particular device’s positive alert gives rise to probable
194
cause. Especially with new technology on the horizon, courts should
establish standards for measuring an investigative tool’s reliability.
IV. Quantifiable Evidence and the Probable Cause Standard
As mentioned earlier, some courts have already begun mandating
admission of quantifiable error rates for specific investigative techniques.
Although the Supreme Court has declared that field accuracy rates are
not absolutely required by the Fourth Amendment in determining the
reliability of drug sniffing dogs, many prosecutors will continue to admit
195
this type of evidence, as they have done in the past. Further, the
prosecution may wish to proffer this type of evidence as part of the
totality of the circumstances in order to rebut evidence by the defendant
that a particular alert is unreliable or a particular dog’s certification is
196
insufficient to establish probable cause. Courts are already confronting
explicitly probabilistic evidence in many forms. When evidence sufficient
to satisfy probable cause is admitted in probabilistic terms, the reasons
for not assigning a minimum probability of certainty necessary to satisfy
probable cause are far less compelling.
There have not been many proposals to quantify probable cause.
According to Professor Craig Lerner, “[f]ew courts have summoned the
courage, or foolhardiness, to propose . . . a number (e.g., thirty percent
197
probability) for probable cause.”
Lerner instead offered a

sionary rule, and into police standards commissions and legislatures.”).
192
Harris v. State, 71 So. 3d 756, 768 (Fla. 2011), overruled by Florida v. Harris, 133 S. Ct. 1050 (2013).
193
See U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, supra note 120, at 90, 164–67.
194
See, e.g., Sam Kamin, Law and Technology: The Case for a Smart Gun Detector,
59 Law & Contemp. Probs. 221, 221 (1996).
195
See supra Part I.
196
In Florida v. Harris, the Supreme Court held that a defendant may counter the prosecution’s evidence that a dog is well trained “by disputing the reliability of
the dog overall or of a particular alert.” 133 S. Ct. 1050, 1058 (2013). This may lead
particular states to require record keeping on field accuracy rates anyway, as these
accuracy rates are certainly relevant to any totality of the circumstances inquiry.
197
Craig S. Lerner, The Reasonableness of Probable Cause, 81 Tex. L. Rev. 951,
995 (2003).
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mathematical formula to evaluate whether there is sufficient probable
cause based on the probability of a successful search and its social value
198
against a search’s social cost, or privacy intrusion. Another scholar,
Ronald Bacigal, came closer to quantifying probable cause, by assigning
199
probable cause a range of approximately 40–49%, but stopped short of
200
“endorsing precise mathematical expressions of probable cause.”
Bacigal, wishing to add some clarity to the probable cause inquiry, still
cautions that “[t]oo much precision diminishes the resources of
201
ambiguity.”
There are situations, however, where the utility of ambiguity is
outweighed by the benefits of clarifying the standard, especially in light
of recent developments that have greatly diminished review of probable
202
cause decisions. Quantifying probable cause would add both integrity
and accountability to the jurisprudence, allowing citizens to evaluate
courts’ decisions and reducing cynicism over application of the fuzzy,
203
“malleable probable cause analysis.” Quantifying probable cause can
also provide police with a more certain standard to guide their decisions
in the field.
This final section examines how assigning a minimum numerical
value to the probable cause hurdle would function in a variety of
scenarios, and explores how courts should choose the numerical value.
In so doing, this section rebuts the myriad objections by courts and
scholars to quantifying probable cause.
A. Quantifying Probable Cause
Quantifying probable cause presents varying benefits and drawbacks,
depending on the types of evidence used to satisfy probable cause. There
are three basic scenarios in which judges would confront a numerical
probable cause standard. In cases where a positive alert from a
mechanized device is the critical factor in producing probable cause,
many of the objections to assigning probable cause a value disappear.
The quantifiable evidence can be used directly to determine whether the
probable cause standard is satisfied. In cases where both quantitative and

198
Id. at 1019–21. Lerner’s formula looks like this: P × V > (1 – P) × (C ×
m), where P is the probability a search will be successful, V is the value of the search,
C is the cost of the search, and m is the privacy multiplier for particularly stigmatizing
searches. Id. at 1020–21.
199
Bacigal, supra note 20, at 338–39.
200
Id. at 339.
201
Id. Bacigal also argued that the requisite degree of suspicion should depend somewhat on the severity of the crime and the exigencies of the circumstances.
See id. at 323–32. These views will be addressed infra Part IV.B.
202
See supra Part II.B.
203
See John M. Burkoff, The Fourth Amendment and Terrorism, 109 Penn St. L.
Rev. 911, 920–21 (2005) (describing the “‘fluid’ and open-ended conception of probable cause” articulated in Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 370–72 (2003)).
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qualitative evidence are necessary to satisfy probable cause, judges cannot
rely solely on the number produced by the quantifiable evidence and
compare it to the probable cause number. However, judges can use the
value associated with probable cause to discern how close the
quantifiable evidence comes to satisfying probable cause and can then
assess whether the qualitative evidence, combined with the quantitative
evidence, crosses the probable cause threshold. In cases where only
qualitative evidence is considered, assigning probable cause a numerical
percentage is valuable only to the extent that it provides a conceptual
benchmark, but judges should not attempt to actually quantify the
inquiry.
1. Cases Where Quantifiable Evidence Is the Critical Factor in Satisfying
Probable Cause
In situations where quantifiable evidence is the sole or critical factor
creating probable cause, the benefits of added clarity in the law outweigh
the downsides of quantifying probable cause. Consider a common
scenario. The police pull over a vehicle and briefly detain an individual
for reasons unrelated to drug possession, such as making an improper
204
205
lane change, or having an improperly illuminated license plate.
While detained, the individual behaves suspiciously, perhaps appearing
206
nervous when answering questions, but the behavior is not sufficiently
suspicious to give the police probable cause to search the vehicle for
207
evidence of illegal activity. However, the suspicion suffices to permit the
police to continue detaining the individual to wait for a drug sniffing dog
208
to arrive and sniff the exterior of the vehicle. The dog positively alerts
to the presence of drugs inside the vehicle, giving the police probable
209
cause to search the vehicle, and drugs are ultimately found. A court
210
upholds the search, largely based on the dog’s alert. The court will cite
language such as “[a] positive identification by a dog during a canine
search following a lawful stop of a vehicle provides probable cause that
drugs are present in the vehicle, thereby justifying a search of the
211
vehicle.”

204

See, e.g., United States v. Lopez-Gutierrez, 334 Fed. App’x. 880, 881 (10th

Cir. 2009).
205

See, e.g., United States v. Mohamed, 600 F.3d 1000, 1002 (8th Cir. 2010).
Id.
207
See id. (“Trooper Frisby told Mohamed that he had reasonable suspicion
to run a drug dog around the car.”).
208
See Lopez-Gutierrez, 334 Fed. App’x. at 883 (“A traffic stop may be extended if the officer has reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity.”).
209
See Mohamed, 600 F.3d at 1002–03.
210
See Lopez-Gutieriez, 334 Fed. App’x. at 883 (“An alert by a certified drugsniffing dog during a sweep of the exterior of the vehicle can give probable cause to
search the interior.”).
211
Mohamed, 600 F.3d at 1004.
206
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In this scenario, the sniff is the critical factor in satisfying probable
cause. The police would likely concede that probable cause did not exist
prior to the positive alert, and a court would likely justify the search
almost exclusively based on that positive alert. Now assume that this dog
212
and handler’s field accuracy rate is 50%. This court’s probable cause
assessment would be greatly assisted if the court knew that probable
cause requires a 35% probability, a 40% probability, a 50%, or a 51%
probability of criminal activity.
Accepting the field accuracy rate as the best evidence of the
likelihood that drugs are in the vehicle, the court can compare the field
accuracy rate to the assigned probable cause standard to determine if
probable cause is met solely based on the positive alert. Courts make this
213
comparison already. Courts holding that the accuracy rates of certain
devices are sufficient to satisfy probable cause must have some fuzzy
minimum threshold in their minds, but that number is not uniform and
is usually not transparent to the citizenry, the police, or other courts. As
one court held in the context of drug sniffing dogs, “based on historical
performance, this dog’s alert suggested a 58% chance of finding a
seizable quantity of drugs. While we hesitate to get into the business of
affixing figures on probable cause, if we were pushed to do so we would
214
hold this to be enough.”
This example demonstrates a situation where many of the objections
to quantifying the probable cause standard are overblown. When the
evidence in favor of suspicion is already quantified in a form that directly
215
translates into the probable cause question, it seems silly to doggedly
contend that probable cause is incapable of quantification. Although
some scholars have argued that “using math to enlighten discussions of
216
probable cause” gives the illusion of precision, the sense of precision
gleaned from quantifying probable cause is no longer false when field
accuracy rates are collected and calculated correctly. Further, the
concern that assigning a minimum probable cause probability will cause
courts to give undue weight to probabilistic evidence over nonscientific
or case-specific evidence is greatly diminished in cases where probable
217
cause is satisfied based on quantifiable evidence.
212
For the difference between false positive rates and field accuracy rates,
see supra Part III.B.
213
United States v. Anderson, 367 Fed. App’x 30, 33 (11th Cir. 2010) (allowing a 55% accuracy rate to satisfy probable cause); United States v. Koon Chung
Wu, 217 Fed. App’x 240, 246 (4th Cir. 2007) (“[A]n accuracy rate of 60% is more
than reliable enough for [the dog’s] alert to have established probable cause.”).
214
United States v. Ludwig, 641 F.3d 1243, 1252 (10th Cir. 2011) (footnote
omitted).
215
For the form in which this evidence should be submitted, see supra Part III.B.
216
Antkowiak, supra note 20, at 586 (arguing that “math seduces lawyers
with the siren song of precision, certainty, and constancy”).
217
Scholars have vigorously debated whether, in the context of jury trials,
jurors give undue weight to probabilistic evidence, like the probability associated with
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Moreover, in cases like the one presented above, even if there are
other factors besides the quantified evidence that also create suspicion,
these factors can be directly translated into the accuracy rate of the
device. The qualitative evidence essentially becomes quantitative. Thus, if
field statistics are collected in situations that closely resemble the case at
218
issue, the court should not even factor in other suspicious behavior,
like the failure to maintain eye contact with the police. The field accuracy
rate will already reflect the fact that most suspects targeted for the drug
219
sniff display some amount of suspicious behavior.
However, there will be instances where the data on field
performance is not sufficiently numerous or specific to extrapolate the
220
likelihood of criminal behavior from the field accuracy rate alone. In
those cases, there is a legitimate concern that assigning probable cause a
numerical value will cause a judge to nonetheless feel compelled to use
the insufficient or inapposite accuracy rate to answer the probable cause
inquiry. A more generalized version of this fear has been articled by
Professor Orin Kerr, who contends that if probable cause is quantified
into a hard number, judges will be less likely to heed their logical, yet
221
unexpressed, intuitions and instincts about a case.
Professor Kerr uses an example of a fictional “scientific study by top
Harvard scientists showing that marijuana can be found in 60 percent of
222
Harvard dormitory rooms.” He argues that quantifying probable cause
may stifle a judge’s intuition that the 60% suspicion created by the study,
although a high enough percentage to satisfy probable cause, feels
insufficient. This instinct is based on the subconscious but logical
skepticism as to why additional evidence was not collected to rule out or
place specific suspicion upon the particular dorm room that police
223
sought to search. Instead of allowing judges to follow their intuitions

a suspect’s DNA matching evidence left at a crime scene, at the expense of nonscientific or circumstantial evidence. See, e.g., Brenda Inman Rowe, Note, A Possible Solution
for the Problem of Juries Slighting Nonscientific Evidence: A Bayesian-Like Judicial Instruction,
24 Am. J. Crim. L. 541, 541–47 (1997) (“An important question in this age of increasing use of scientific evidence in criminal trials is whether jurors consider scientific
evidence to the exclusion, or near-exclusion, of nonscientific evidence.”); Brian C.
Smith et al., Jurors’ Use of Probabilistic Evidence, 20 Law & Hum. Behav. 49, 54–78
(1996) (concluding that mock jurors can reasonably assess probabilistic evidence).
Some scholars have actually concluded that juries do not attach enough weight to
probabilistic evidence over case-specific evidence. E.g., Julie A. Singer et al., The Impact of DNA and Other Technology on the Criminal Justice System: Improvements and Complications, 17 Alb. L.J. Sci. & Tech. 87, 108 (2007) (“[J]urors . . . . often seriously underestimate the weight of probabilistic evidence.”).
218
See supra Part III.B for an example of this.
219
See supra Part III.B.
220
See supra Part III.C. for problems with measuring accuracy rates.
221
Kerr, supra note 5, at 138–39 (explaining that not all instincts are emotional
and illogical, and some may render the probable cause determination for accurate).
222
Id. at 135.
223
Id. at 138–139; see also David H. Kaye, The Paradox of the Gatecrasher and
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about information not provided to the courts, quantifying probable cause
might compel a judge to simply hold that a 60% likelihood satisfies
probable cause.
Professor Kerr, however, does not address situations where
individualized, quantifiable evidence is incorporated into the probable
cause inquiry. His objection reflects the problems inherent in using
group statistics instead of individualized suspicion to satisfy probable
224
cause. Indeed, many of the objections to quantifying probable cause
provide examples involving group probabilities where there is no
225
individualized suspicion. These examples do not pertain to a situation
where the quantifiable evidence is sufficiently particularized on its own to
answer the probable cause inquiry.
Yet, Professor Kerr’s objections may be valid even in cases where
individualized suspicion is quantified. Professor Kerr explains that
quantification of probable cause could provide a “fertile ground for
226
cognitive biases,” such as the “representativeness heuristic,” or “the
tendency to measure probability by reference to data that seem to
227
resemble the probability to be estimated.” A judge may have some
intuition, that she cannot express mathematically, that the statistical
evidence tending toward suspicion has not been properly collected or
calculated, but she may feel compelled to compare a 49% field accuracy
rate presented to a 45% established hurdle and find that probable cause
is satisfied.
A thorough understanding of the issues at play would allow a judge
to discount certain field accuracy rates as less relevant. For example, if a
dog’s field accuracy rate is 60%, but a judge finds that the field accuracy
data was measured in a way that was not specific enough, she can decide
that she is confident enough in that data to allow it to satisfy a 40%
probable cause hurdle, if probable cause is defined that way, but not a
50% probable cause hurdle. Alternatively, judges need not accept all
field accuracy rates as dispositive of probable cause if there is reason to
doubt them. For example, a Massachusetts court of appeals upheld a trial
court’s finding that a canine alert did not satisfy probable cause because
the dog’s training was deficient in some areas, and because he had
properly detected drugs only five or six times and had improperly alerted

Other Stories, 1979 Ariz. St. L.J. 101 (1979).
224
For the distinction between probabilities relevant to individualized suspicion and group probabilities, see supra Part I.D.
225
Professor Joseph Grano has argued that probable cause should exist
where police know that one of a group of ten people have committed a crime, because the 1/10 chance of criminality based on this group statistic “causes us to overlook the success of the police in narrowing their investigation from the universe of all
possible suspects, which may include much of the population, to ten individuals.”
Grano, supra note 20, at 496.
226
Kerr, supra note 5, at 132.
227
Id. at 139.
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228

to drugs twice. Defining the probable cause standard would likely not
have affected this outcome, as there was so little data that the two false
positives alarmed the judge.
Moreover, judges are already finding probable cause based on field
accuracy rates, often without fully assessing whether these accuracy rates
229
can be extrapolated into the probable cause inquiry. A judge may just
as easily harbor illogical intuitive views about a case, such as that certain
investigative devices are nearly infallible and their positive alerts should
always satisfy probable cause. Requiring quantifiable evidence and
quantifying probable cause would undermine judges’ discretion to
import their unfounded assumptions into a standardless probable cause
inquiry. Quantifying probable cause when the evidence is already in
probabilistic form would allow a good balance between judicial discretion
and judicial transparency/uniformity.
Of course, in cases where a field accuracy rate obviously exceeds the
probable cause hurdle, assigning a numerical value to probable cause is
230
less important. Judges do not need to know that a “fair probability” is
48% in order to determine that probable cause is met by a drug sniffing
dog with a properly calculated 90% field accuracy rate. However, the
Supreme Court should reject the notion that probable cause cannot be
defined numerically in anticipation of the marginal cases, which do exist,
231
especially as more technology replaces traditional police work. Once
the view that probable cause cannot be quantified is rejected, the
Supreme Court could either allow lower courts to experiment with
selecting a number before ultimately assigning one, or the Court could
simply give guidance on what that number is when it confronts a
probable cause case where the critical evidence is quantifiable.
2. When Quantifiable Evidence Is Presented Alongside Other Factors
When quantifiable evidence must be considered by a court alongside
several other significant factors, assigning a numerical value to probable
cause has a greater chance of distorting the probable cause inquiry. The
concern that courts will overvalue probabilistic evidence becomes more
salient when the probabilistic evidence is insufficient on its own to satisfy
probable cause. However, assigning probable cause a numerical value
would assist judges in understanding the significance of the quantifiable
evidence and then determining how much more qualitative evidence is
needed to cross the probable cause hurdle.

228

Commonwealth v. Ramos, 894 N.E.2d 611, 613–14, 617 (Mass. App. Ct. 2008).
See supra Part III.
230
See supra Part I.A.
231
See United States v. Sanchez-Tamayo, No. 1:10-CR-0532, 2011 WL
7767740, *14 (N.D. Ga. 2011) (“Courts have held that an accuracy rate of approximately 50%–60% ‘in finding measurable amounts of drugs’ does not undermine the
reliability of the K-9 to the extent of negating probable cause.” (quoting United States
v. Anderson, 367 F. App’x 30, 33 (11th Cir. 2010))).
229
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For example, consider a case where facial recognition technology’s
accuracy rate is 42%. The police had a positive alert to a pedestrian by
this technology, but the police also had reason to believe that this
pedestrian was a wanted bank robber because he appears nervous and
walks briskly past police officers. Assuming that a 42% likelihood of
criminal activity is not sufficient to satisfy probable cause, assigning a
numerical value to probable cause allows a judge to assess how closely the
quantifiable evidence comes to being sufficient. The quantifiable
evidence’s contribution to the probable cause inquiry can be resolved,
and now it is up to the judge’s discretion and prior case law to determine
if the qualitative factors pointing towards suspicion cross the probable
232
cause threshold. Probable cause functions as more of a benchmark to
guide judges. If probable cause is set at 60%, a judge will want to see a lot
more qualitative evidence than if probable cause is set at 45%.
In cases like these, it is important to note that any extra suspicion,
like the suspect’s nervousness or brisk walking, may already be reflected
in the accuracy rate of the facial recognition technology. Judges must be
careful not to double count suspicion, which would occur if the statistical
evidence collected on the facial recognition device already reflects the
fact that most suspects targeted for use by the technology also appear
nervous. However, if this technology is usually used on random
individuals, or whenever a passerby resembles a wanted suspect without
regard to whether he appears suspicious, then a judge should consider
the suspect’s nervousness and brisk walking to augment the suspicion
calculated by positive alert by facial recognition technology. This type of
analysis also applies to drug sniffing dogs and all other technology whose
accuracy is measured in the field.
3. When All of the Evidence Is Qualitative
When all of the evidence presented is qualitative, or when judges
give little weight to the quantifiable evidence, courts should not feel
compelled to use the percentage assigned to probable cause to dispose of
the probable cause inquiry. However, assigning a numerical value to
probable cause can still assist judges in making probable cause
determinations, so long as they appreciate that this number serves only as
a reference.
This might occur in a case involving an informant with a track record
that is reliable but that that does not reflect enough data points to be
directly extrapolated into the probable cause inquiry. If the court
determines based on experience, intuition, and prior case law that the
232

The Daubert inquiry, although not necessary during the probable cause
analysis, could serve as a model of how judges may conduct a flexible inquiry, examining several factors, some of which are quantifiable and some of which are not. See supra Part III.C; see also Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 141 (1999) (applying Daubert “to the testimony of engineers and other experts who are not scientists”
because Daubert’s inquiry is “flexible,” and some of its factors may be disregarded or
given extra weight by judges).
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informant’s statements are sufficiently corroborated by the police to
satisfy probable cause, the court need not trouble itself with the actual
233
quantum of suspicion assigned as a minimum value to probable cause.
Prior case law would control regardless of the likelihood assigned to
probable cause.
Yet, having some conception of the magnitude of the probable cause
hurdle can assist judges in evaluating whether an informant’s testimony
has met the standard. Without feeling bound by the number, or
compelled to quantify the inquiry, a judge’s assessment of whether a
unique set of facts satisfies probable cause may well change depending
on whether probable cause is 30% or 50%.
Alternatively, in cases where most or all of the evidence is qualitative,
and assigning a precise number to probable cause is unhelpful, judges
could conceptualize probable cause as a range, as Professor Bacigal
234
proposes. This would alleviate some of the confusion surrounding
probable cause, without fostering many of the cognitive biases that arise
when flexible inquiries are made overly rigid. This range could place as
its center the number assigned to probable cause for cases where
quantifiable evidence is the critical factor demonstrating probable cause.
When quantifiable evidence and unquantifiable evidence are both
essential to the probable cause inquiry, or when all of the evidence is
qualitative, flexibility in application of the probable cause standard is
important. Quantifying probable cause may undermine this flexibility if
judges ignore their intuitions or convert evidence that is not susceptible
to quantification into fictional percentages. Courts must be advised about
the pitfalls inherent in quantifying the standard.
B. Selecting the Number
The selection of the number associated with the probable cause
hurdle will be a difficult endeavor. The number assigned must reflect the
fact that probable cause balances the degree of suspicion at which law
235
enforcement interests trump privacy interests.
Additionally, the
numerical threshold must be a percentage that judges can easily abstract
and conceptualize in their minds.
Although there is wide variance regarding what this percentage is, a
significant number of courts and scholars assume that probable cause is
236
within the 40% to 51% range. In case assigning probable cause a
233

See United States v. Searcy, 664 F.3d 1119, 1121–22 (7th Cir. 2011) (upholding the search of defendant’s home where confidential informant’s direct observations of defendant and reliable track record compensated for the absence of detail
provided by the informant).
234
See Bacigal, supra note 20, at 338–39 (placing a “fair probability” within
the 40% to 49% range).
235
See supra Part I.A.
236
See supra note 61 and accompanying text; see also Daniel A. Crane, Rethinking Merger Efficiencies, 110 Mich. L. Rev. 347, 356 (2011) (“The Supreme Court
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numerical value will dilute its power and mystery, and consequently the
privacy protections that it affords, probable cause should be placed
towards the higher end of this range. Many courts have assumed that
probable cause does not require a preponderance of the evidence in
237
favor of suspicion, but this standard can be conceptually helpful in
selecting a benchmark.
In Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, in contexts unrelated to
probable cause, judges frequently apply the preponderance-of-the238
This standard has an approximate numerical
evidence standard.
percentage of just above 50%; some describe it as akin to “[50%] and a
239
240
feather,” others deem it to be 51%. One solution to assigning
probable cause a number that is easy to conceptualize is to select the
other side of the preponderance standard, so that probable cause is
satisfied at just slightly lower than 50%. For courts, then, a “fair
probability” would occur where the evidence tending towards suspicion is
almost at the point where it is in equipoise, but may be slightly less.
Because judges already have a sense of when evidence tips slightly above
50%, they can also appreciate when evidence slips slightly below 50%, or
the other side of the preponderance coin.
Through the stages of review, slightly below 50% would be used as a
benchmark. At the lowest level of the inquiry, an “officer of reasonable
241
caution” must be able to believe that evidence of a crime would be
found by at least 50% (this is, after all, what it usually means to have a
belief), but a magistrate judge issuing a warrant or a court examining a
warrantless search of an automobile would assign as the “fair
242
probability” a value slightly below 50%. Alternatively, judges could
place some band of error around 50% to determine whether a
reasonable police officer could have considered the likelihood of

has denied that probable cause is susceptible of ‘precise definition or quantification
into percentages,’ but practitioners and commentators often understand it to lie in
the 40–45 percent range.” (quoting Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003))
(footnote omitted)).
237
See supra note 62.
238
For example, in Nix v. Williams, the Supreme Court held that courts
should apply a preponderance-of-the-evidence test to the “inevitable discovery rule,”
which allows the admission of evidence obtained after a Fourth Amendment violation
if it would have been discovered eventually through lawful means. 467 U.S. 431, 444
(1984) (“If the prosecution can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the
information ultimately or inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means . . .
the evidence should be received.”).
239
E.g., Gordon Shemin, Mercury Rising: The Omnibus Autism Proceeding and
What Families Should Know Before Rushing Out of Vaccine Court, 58 Am. U. L. Rev. 459,
476 n.84 (2008).
240
E.g., Jean Macchiaroli Eggen, Toxic Reproductive and Genetic Hazards in the
Workplace: Challenging the Myths of the Tort and Workers’ Compensation Systems, 60 Fordham L. Rev. 843, 893 (1992).
241
See supra Part I.
242
Id.
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243

criminal behavior to be 50%. Then, reviewing courts decide if there is a
244
“substantial basis” for concluding that this threshold of slightly below
50%, the inferiority of the evidence, is met.
A serious consequence of assigning probable cause one particular
percentage is that it will force courts to apply the same probable cause
value regardless of the severity of the crime. The Court currently
maintains, according to Professor Bacigal, “the fiction of one uniform
245
definition of probable cause.” However, some justices and lower courts
have insinuated that the probable cause standard should be a sliding
246
scale, depending on the gravity of the offense. Justice Robert Jackson
wrote in a dissenting opinion that
[i]f we assume, for example, that a child is kidnaped and the
officers throw a roadblock about the neighborhood and search
every outgoing car, it would be a drastic and undiscriminating use
of the search. The officers might be unable to show probable cause
for searching any particular car. However, I should candidly strive
hard to sustain such an action, executed fairly and in good faith,
because it might be reasonable to subject travelers to that indignity
if it was the only way to save a threatened life and detect a vicious
crime. But I should not strain to sustain such a roadblock and
universal search to salvage a few bottles of bourbon and catch a
bootlegger.247
There are important reasons why the probable cause hurdle should
not vary depending on the severity of the crime uncovered. A variable
probable cause standard might enable courts to use hindsight judgment
to uphold or invalidate searches, depending on how severe the criminal
activity ultimately turned out to be. Having probable cause depend on
balancing the severity of the crime against the nature of the intrusion
would also convert probable cause into a more general “reasonableness”
standard, whose malleability is even more susceptible to manipulation
based on the concerns of the day than the harder line of the probable
248
cause standard.
243

An analogue occurs in the context of conditional probabilities, where
evidence is probative only if a precondition is met. For example, the fact that a murder victim cheated on the defendant is relevant to prove motive only if the defendant
was aware of the cheating. In those cases, a judge will admit evidence of the cheating
if a reasonable jury could have found that the defendant was aware of this fact by a
preponderance of the evidence. See Fed. R. Evid. 104(b).
244
See supra Part I.
245
Bacigal, supra note 20, at 323.
246
See id. at 324 (quoting Judge Posner’s comment in Llaguno v. Mingey, 763
F.2d 1560, 1565 (7th Cir. 1985), that “probable cause—the area between bare suspicion and virtual certainty—describes not a point but a zone, within which the graver
the crime the more latitude the police must be allowed.”).
247
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 183 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
248
According to several scholars and one retired judge, “the malleable concept of ‘reasonableness’ once unleashed from its textual moorings, found in the
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There are also arguments for allowing flexibility in the probable
cause hurdle depending on the nature of the crime, as Justice Jackson’s
249
However, if the Court wants the
kidnapping example illustrates.
probable cause standard to vary depending on the situation, it should
hold so explicitly, instead of purporting to apply a “single, familiar
250
standard.” The Supreme Court should truly grapple with whether the
severity of the crime should affect probable cause, instead of enabling
251
courts to alter the standard at their discretion, without transparency.
C. Other Solutions
There are, of course, other solutions to incorporating quantifiable
evidence besides assigning a minimum percentage of suspicion necessary
to satisfy probable cause. Courts could, for instance, assign maximum
false positive error rates and conditions of usage in order to allow a
positive alert to be relevant to the probable cause inquiry. Or, courts
could simply mandate that the use of all devices that essentially replace
police officers must be preceded by uniform, standardized training and
testing. These solutions would enable a more rigorous probable cause
inquiry to preclude what many courts are currently doing, which is
presuming that positive alerts by particular devices and investigative
techniques are sufficient, even in the absence of data, to satisfy probable
cause.
Alternatively, if the Supreme Court decides that courts require the
flexibility to alter the probable cause standard depending on the severity
or exigency of the crime, a range can be assigned to probable cause.
Professor Ronald Bacigal proposes quantifying probable cause into a
252
range of 40% to 49% for precisely this reason. Even providing a range
to probable cause would add more uniformity to the inquiry and assist
judges in better assessing quantifiable evidence presented as part of the
probable cause inquiry.
V. Conclusion
As more quantifiable evidence is incorporated into the probable
cause inquiry, courts must grapple seriously with how they assess that
Amendment’s probable cause and warrant requirements, can all too quickly and unnecessarily diminish the compass of liberty and privacy. What is ‘reasonable,’ after all,
is subject to the fears and prejudices of the day.” Laurence A. Benner et al., Criminal
Justice in the Supreme Court: An Analysis of United States Supreme Court Criminal and Habeas Corpus Decisions (October 2, 2000–September 30, 2001), 38 Cal. W. L. Rev. 87, 187
(2001).
249
See supra note 247 and accompanying text.
250
Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 213 (1979).
251
For an interesting proposal on how to incorporate crime severity into
the probable cause analysis, see Jeffrey Bellin, Crime-Severity Distinctions and the Fourth
Amendment: Reassessing Reasonableness in a Changing World, 97 Iowa L. Rev. 1 (2011).
252
See Bacigal, supra note 20, at 338–39.
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evidence. Courts often make the mistake of presuming that certain
fallible investigative devices are sufficient to establish probable cause
without properly calculated evidence of their reliability. Or, if accuracy
rates are admitted as evidence to demonstrate reliability, courts often do
not understand how to evaluate these accuracy rates to best answer the
probable cause question. This Article has endeavored to explain which
types of evidence require accuracy rates, how to calculate and assess those
accuracy rates, and finally how to approach the probable cause inquiry
using quantifiable evidence. In the process, it has argued that probable
cause should be assigned a numerical value in cases where quantifiable
evidence is the critical basis on which probable cause is satisfied.

